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1 Introduction
International remittances, the money that migrants send back to their home countries, are one
of the key components of international capital flows. In 2017, officially recorded remittance
flows to developing countries reached $466 billion and the amount is estimated to increase
by about 4.1% to reach $485 billion in 2018. It has been observed that in many countries,
remittances are larger and have exhibited more stability compared to foreign direct investments
and, in certain scenarios, even larger than official development assistance. Most governments
in developing countries have increasingly recognized the importance of remittance flows and
are in the process of addressing constraints that hamper smooth flows in order to harness the
benefits that remittances offer. This is occasioned by the fact that many developing countries
are characterised by low domestic saving and high government expenditure. As a matter of fact,
remittances which happen to constitute external source of finance play a critical role in local
development and poverty reduction.
There is a vast literature on remittances and their role with respect to developing countries.
This dissertation identifies the gaps in existing literature and covers the additional pertinent
issues of consideration that would be of concern to researchers and policy makers. We begin by
viewing remittances in positive light by considering the potential stabilizing role of remittances.
We then proceed to evaluate whether remittances could potentially pose a risk to monetary
policy transmission process owing to their cyclical nature. Within this framework, we deem it
necessary to critically investigate the cause of cyclicality in remittance flows owing to the fact
that existing literature is inconclusive. Having set the concept on cyclicality of remittances clear,
we finalize our discussion by evaluating whether remittances promote financial inclusion.
The first paper, “The role of remittance inflows to developing countries in the aftermath of
sovereign defaults” sheds light on the countercyclical role of remittances. We do this by taking
into account sovereign defaults as an indicator of economic distress on the recipient economies
and we evaluate whether remittances increase after the default episode. There exists a vast
literature on the cyclicality of remittances and their role as shock absorbers but within this
strand of literature, we consider sovereign defaults as a specific case of negative shock. All in
all, our main aim is to evaluate how remittances could possibly assist countries cope with large
negative shocks.
We conduct Dynamic System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique
for 81 developing economies taking into account alternative default definitions and standard
control variables. The results show that a sovereign default episode occasions an upsurge in
remittance flows to developing economies thus contributing towards economic stability of re-
cipient economies.
The second paper, “Remittance inflows and state dependent monetary policy in developing
countries” which I coauthored with Peter Tillmann, provides an analysis of the business cy-
cle effects of remittance inflows. We specifically focus on the interaction between procyclical
inflows of migrant remittances and the transmission of monetary policy impulses under two
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remittance regimes. The paper uses local projections methodology which allows for state de-
pendent coefficients and state dependent impulse-response functions. We derive the evidence
with respect to Kenya, Mexico, the Phillipines and Colombia.
We find that monetary policy effects are state dependent such that, in the presence of strong
remittance inflows, a given policy shock is significantly less effective than under moderate in-
flows. This implies that procyclical remittances pose a challenge to monetary policy such that
a tightening of monetary policy will be less effective if remittances surge concurrently. Ineffec-
tiveness will also be observed in a scenario where policy easing takes place during episodes of
exceptionally weak remittance inflows.
The third paper, “Are remittances cyclical? The role of south-south flows” coauthored with
Peter Tillmann, revisits the cyclical nature of remittance inflows and the role of south-south
remittance inflows. In the final analysis we provide new evidence as to why prior researchers
could not come up with a consensus regarding the cyclical properties of remittances. We attain
this by distinguishing north-south from south-south flows, and we show that a larger share of
remittance inflows emanating from other low income countries significantly reduces the cycli-
cality of flows. Our results suggest that the large share of countries with acyclical remittance
inflows can be explained by south-south flows.
The fourth and last paper, “Do remittance flows promote financial inclusion?” evaluates the
extent to which remittances contribute to financial inclusion within the context of developing
and emerging economies. This concept is built on the notion that remittances are inherently pro-
poor and are direct in nature. Moreover, financial inclusion has been perceived as a fundamental
underpinning of wider progress.
We construct a new index of financial inclusion and present single equation estimates of the
effects of remittances on financial inclusion using data from 61 developing countries. We then
employ GMM instrumental variables estimation techniques, and our results depict a positive
and significant relationship between financial inclusion and remittances.
In general terms, we acknowledge the fact that although remittances are an important source of
development finance, they are not a panacea to development issues.
All four papers are separate works and presented as such. The first and fourth papers are un-
published working papers. Both versions are available at the MAGKS website under Joint Dis-
cussion Paper Series section. The second paper is under review for publication consideration
while the third paper is already published in the Journal of International Trade, Politics and
Development.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Remittance Inflows to Developing Countries
in the Aftermath of Sovereign Defaults
The Role of Remittance Inflows to Developing
Countries in the Aftermath of Sovereign Defaults
Immaculate Machasio∗
Abstract
In this paper, we empirically examine what happens to international re-
mittances in the aftermath of a sovereign default and the extent to which
they contribute to resilience of the recipient economies. To this end, we con-
duct Dynamic System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation
methodologies by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
taking into account annual data cutting across 81 countries from 1990-2010.
Robustness checks reveal that remittances play a significant role and are in-
deed resilient when evaluated in the aftermath of sovereign defaults. We find
that the occurrence of a sovereign default spurs on an upsurge in remittances
which play a stabilizing role in the recipient economy. The findings unrav-
elled in this paper are important especially for policy makers to facilitate the
process of harnessing positive benefits associated with remittance inflows to
developing countries.
Keywords: Remittances, Sovereign Defaults, Capital Flows, Generalised
Methods of Moments.
JEL classification: C23, F34, H63.
∗Email: Immaculate.N.Machasio@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
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1 Introduction
On an international level, migration tendencies in the recent past have depicted
that migrants have become increasingly more directly involved in divergent socio-
economic activities in their home countries. Migration and the associated remit-
tances are becoming an ever increasing and important aspect of the global economy.
Migrants have also been observed to have vested interest in their countries of origin
and therefore send some money back home in form of remittances. Consequently,
due to growth in remittances, considerable attention has been focused on these cross
border transfers from both private and public sectors. Owing to the fact that re-
mittances are considered to be unilateral transfers, they do not create any future
obligations or liabilities for instance debt servicing or profit transfers. In contrast to
other forms of capital inflows, remittances have been resilient, and they indeed repre-
sent a very significant component of the balance of payments of recipient countries.1
Factors purported to have triggered rapid growth include: increase in international
migration, remittance fee reductions as well as convenience of transferring money
through formal channels and better measurement and reporting of remittances in
the balance of payments statistics.
Remittances by international migrants to their home countries constitute the largest
source of external finance to developing countries after foreign direct investment
(FDI), as illustrated by Ratha (2003). These remittance flows are several times
larger than remaining private capital inflows and official aid. For that reason, they
are likely to serve as macroeconomic stabilizers because migrant workers are ex-
pected to substantially increase the amounts transferred to help family members
in their countries of origin to compensate for the resulting drops in household in-
come, whenever the economic activity in their country of origin slows down. This is
according to World Bank (2006).
Remittances have also been relatively stable and exhibited resilience as compared to
other capital flows especially during economic downturns as was observed during the
most recent financial crisis. Between 2008 and 2009 remittances remained relatively
steady and decreased by only 5.2%. Contrastingly, FDI in poor countries fell by a
third during the crisis and portfolio inflows fell by more than half during the same
period as shown by Ratha and Sirkeci (2010). The volatility dampening effect of
remittances has also been observed to be larger in poorer countries where investment
opportunities are pocket-sized and consumption needs are strong as depicted by
1Remittance data documented in World Bank reports takes into account summation of both
personal transfers and compensation of employees. This is because some countries are not in a
position to distinguish between the two aforementioned variables.
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Bugamelli and Paterno (2011).
Within the spectrum of public finance, sovereign defaults are considered to be a
recurring feature. They typically emanate from failure or refusal of the government
of a sovereign state to repay its debt in full.2 Cessation of outstanding amounts may
either be accompanied by repudiation of a government not to pay (or only partially
pay) its debts, or it may be unannounced. A default typically occurs when the
government is in a vulnerable financial position owing to high debt service. This
could be as a result of deterioration in economic fundamentals consequently leading
to a negative change in creditor expectations and a sudden stop in capital flows
follows. A number of studies suggest that a default is often associated with a de-
cline in output growth. See, for instance, Panizza, Sturznegger and Zettelmeyer
(2009). Generally, it is well acknowledged that defaults are costly because they are
associated with penalty costs, reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs,
and sometimes political costs to authorities. However, sovereign countries are not
subject to normal bankruptcy laws and have the potential to escape responsibility
for debts without legal consequences. We consider sovereign defaults to be a special
type of negative shock because they are likely to be occasioned by limited resource
availability to the sovereign, high borrowing costs as well as changes in political cir-
cumstances. Although empirical evidence does not suggest that a default necessarily
closes off market access, it mentions an adverse effect on the government’s cost of
future borrowing as demonstrated by Borensztein and Panizza (2009).
Taking into consideration the fact that migration and remittances that emanate
from such movements of people are substantially becoming an important aspect of
the global economy, it is important to examine their impact. This issue is an im-
portant topic of analysis with respect to the significance of remittance flows towards
developing economies. This also holds taking into consideration the relative stability
of workers’ remittances versus that of other inflows to developing countries. There
exists a consensus that remittances provide additional macroeconomic benefits in
terms of reduced volatility of output and smoothed consumption.
Our working hypothesis is that remittance flows, owing to their size and cyclical
properties, can help to smooth consumption and investment in the aftermath of a
sovereign default and in effect contribute to economic stability by virtue of increasing
in volume. In this regard, the aim of this paper is to evaluate whether remittance
flows remain steady or even increase in the aftermath of a sovereign default. We
contribute to the literature in several ways because first, we conduct an analysis
2It is worth noting that the term default covers any change in the original debt contract resulting
in a loss of value to the creditor, e. g. debt rescheduling.
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for a large number of countries and a wide time-frame. Furthermore, this question
has not yet been addressed since preponderance of literature on remittances has
focused on output growth, financial sector development, poverty, real exchange rate
appreciation and current account reversals.
Our analysis covers 81 countries over the period 1990-2010. The results obtained
utilizing Paris Club data suggest that there exists a broad tendency for countries
to receive an upsurge of remittance inflows after default episodes, therefore suggest-
ing that remittance flows are particularly beneficial in the aftermath of a default.
The results depicted by Paris Club Data are in line with our expectations because
remittances heighten in the aftermath of sovereign default. We find that indeed
the increment in remittances takes place at least two years after the occurrence of
a sovereign default and thus plays a very important role to the recipient economy.
To address biases due to reverse causality, we run regressions including lagging re-
gressors one period by way of conducting Dynamic System Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) estimations. GMM estimation addresses endogeneity concerns
by using lagged variables as instruments. We also implement fixed effects estima-
tions taking into consideration both country and period fixed effects. Country fixed
effects control for unobserved time-invariant country features. We base our con-
clusions on GMM estimations because GMM estimation results are more reliable
owing to the fact that GMM estimators are known to be consistent, asymptotically
normal, and efficient in the class of all estimators which are encompassed in the
moment conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a critical
review of the related literature regarding sovereign defaults and remittances. Sec-
tion 3 describes the econometric methodology and data sources. The same section
also provides a thorough descriptive analysis of remittances and sovereign defaults.
Section 4 introduces our empirical specifications whose base results are presented in
section 5. In section 5, the link between remittances and sovereign defaults is also
investigated as well as the robustness of our findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
A massive amount of theoretical literature deals with the impact of remittances on
recipient economies. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for instance acknowledge altru-
ism, exchange, inheritance, strategic motives, insurance and investment theories of
remittance determination. Empirical evidence attest to the fact that remittances
increase most when migrants’ countries of origin experience some kind of macroe-
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conomic shocks. To depict the aforementioned correlation, Yang (2008) employs
a global dataset on hurricanes to show that remittances increase to countries that
experience these natural disasters. Evaluating this within the wider spectrum of
international financial flows, his findings reveal that for poorer countries, hurricanes
lead to increase in migrant remittances. This is however contrary to the findings
when richer countries are taken into account. The results show that the impact of
hurricanes to some extent varies according to income level. Giulia et al. (2015)
utilize data from Italian households to examine how international remittances are
affected by macroeconomic conditions, structural characteristics and adverse shocks
in recipient economies. They find a negative correlation between remittances and
the business cycle as well as high increment in remittances in response to adverse
exogenous shocks such as a large decline in terms of trade. According to their anal-
ysis, countercyclical remittances are mostly observed in migrant communities with
a larger share of newly arrived migrants. The results partly support the theory
behind altruism as a motive for remitting funds. David (2010) uses a multivariate
dynamic panel analysis to evaluate the response of international financial flows to
natural disasters, and the results show that remittance inflows surge significantly in
response to shocks to both climatic and geological disasters. The results emanating
from the study support the notion that remittance flows can play a hedging and
compensatory role during episodes when the countries in the sample experience ad-
verse shocks. Although a significant portion of remittance inflows is for altruistic
reasons to support consumption and living standards of migrants’ relatives, some of
the migrants are also motivated to remit in order to benefit from monetary gains and
take advantage of incentives offered in their home countries. Agarwal and Horowitz
(2002) use multiple migrants households data to test altruism versus risk sharing
motives and they give evidence supporting altruistic incentives while contrastingly,
Lianos and Cavounidis (2010) argue that remittances depend on both altruism and
risk sharing motives. This is with respect to experiences derived from immigrants to
Greece. In their opinion, variations in migrant income may to some extent be borne
by the migrants themselves rather than be mirrored in the remittance behaviour of
households.
Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2005) perform a panel regression estimation, and
the results of the estimations reveal that the coefficients on the income gap variable
are negative and highly significant. Consequently this provides strong cross-country
evidence that remittances are better described as compensatory transfers.
It is widely acknowledged that remittance flows can be shock absorbers for the re-
cipient economy and play a role in scaling down the country’s vulnerability. In more
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general terms, remittances can improve creditworthiness and as a result facilitate
access to international capital markets based on the evaluation of Avendano, Guil-
lard and Nieto-Parra (2011). According to proposition put forth, remittances not
only smooth out current account deficits but also aggrandize international reserves
which can be used to repay foreign debt. Bugamelli and Paterno (2009) suggest that
remittances bolster financial stability by diminishing the probability of current ac-
count reversals. Using a large panel of emerging markets and developing economies,
they find out that large, cheap, stable and low-cyclical flows of workers remittances
reduce the probability of current account reversals in recipient countries. They use
Instrumental Variables estimations to demonstrate the fact that the effect of remit-
tances on current account reversals is causal in nature. Combes et al. (2014) provide
a new insight by evaluating whether remittances and foreign aid hedge developing
countries against food price shocks. The results show that aid and remittances are
procyclical with respect to food price shocks. To add on that, it was evident that
the response of remittances to such shocks is much higher. IMF (2005) hypothesizes
that large, stable and low-cyclical inflows of remittances, which add up to the stock
of international reserves can be used to repay sovereign debt and might significantly
lessen the probability of financial crises in the face of worsening economic fundamen-
tals. A significant and positive correlation is found between the level of remittances
and credit ratings on sovereign debt. This therefore confirms empirical evidence
that changes in remittance flows have a significant effect on credit ratings according
to IMF (2005). World Bank documents that the inclusion of remittances in credit
worthiness assessments greatly improves credit ratings done by Fitch, Moody’s and
S&P.
Comparing remittances to other capital flows, Buch and Kuckulenz (2010) postulate
that remittances respond more to demographic variables while private capital flows
respond more to macroeconomic conditions. De et al. (2016) examine the behaviour
of remittances over the business cycle and their potential to act as a stabilizer during
episodes of high business cycle volatility. According to their findings, remittances are
relatively stable and acyclical. In contrast, FDI and debt flows exhibit procyclical
patterns. The implication of their findings suggest that remittances can potentially
critically support consumption in the face of economic adversity.
The finding that remittances facilitate financial development is confirmed in various
cross-country studies. This is a pertinent link to consider because formal remittances
which are accounted for are channeled through mainstream banks and financial in-
stitutions. Based on a dataset of 99 countries for the period 1975-2003, Aggarwal
et al. (2006) find that remittances have a significant and positive impact on bank
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deposits and on the ratio of credit to GDP. This is done because remittances in-
crease aggregate level of deposits and credits. This result is also corroborated in a
separate analysis by Gupta et al. (2009) who examine the influence of remittances
on financial development on a panel of 44 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries from
1975 through to 2004 and provide the same evidence that remittances help in pro-
moting financial development. The remittances-financial development link can be
bidirectional relationship because on one hand, as mentioned by Orozco and Fedewa
(2006), money transmitted through financial system paves way for remittances re-
cipients to obtain other financial products which are offered by financial institutions.
As a result, remittances can increase domestic credit if banks extend credit instru-
ments to remittances recipients owing to the fact that remittances are perceived
to be significant and stable. On the other hand, high financial development can
increase remittance flows because better financial systems facilitate financial flows
as highlighted by Aggarwal et al. (2011). Besides, well developed financial systems
heighten remittance flows by reducing the cost of sending remittances.
With regard to business cycles, there is a tendency of remittances to move coun-
tercyclically with GDP in recipient countries. This is because migrant workers are
expected to remit more during downturn of economic activities in their home coun-
tries. By so doing, they help their families to compensate for lost income due to
adverse conditions like unemployment or other crisis-induced reasons. Sharp in-
creases in remittance inflows after times of economic crisis, for example: Indonesia
(1997), Ecuador (1999) and Argentina (2001), support this view that explains neg-
ative relationship between remittances and income. Sayan (2006) postulates that
remittances reach peak of their own cycle within one year after a trough in the home
country output. He suggests that the countercyclical nature of remittances enables
these remitted funds to serve as a stabilizer that helps smooth out large fluctuations.
The stabilizing impact of remittances has also been examined by various researchers.
Chami et al. (2012) empirically examine the influence of remittances on macroe-
conomic volatility using a cross sectional data of 70 countries and their findings
reveal that countries with high remittances to GDP ratios experience significantly
lower macroeconomic volatility. Bugamelli and Paterno (2011) also perform a sim-
ilar study and examine whether remittances reduce output volatility and they find
evidence to the effect that indeed remittances have a stabilizing impact using a cross
section of about 60 emerging and developing economies.
All the aforementioned review of literature deals with remittances and interactions
with various macroeconomic variables. Focusing on defaults as in a recent study by
Brandt and Jorra (2012), it is evident that foreign aid is not used as a punishment
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instrument for a defaulting country. In essence, the overall amount of foreign aid
given to the defaulting country increases by 6.4% after an occurrence of a sovereign
default. This study augers well with our research because similarly, remittances like
foreign aid increase in the aftermath of a sovereign default.
Tomz and Wright (2007) provide a long run analysis of the relationship between
default and economic performance. The results postulate that there exists a high
tendency for countries to default more often during periods of adverse economic
conditions than during favorable conditions. It was noted that many inexcusable
defaults occurred when political unrests brought new coalitions to power that favored
default for opportunistic or ideological reasons. The latter study is also pertinent
to our research because it points out to the fact that sovereign defaults are often an
indicator of worsening economic fundamentals.
This paper intends to establish the linkage between remittances and sovereign de-
faults. By analyzing the stabilizing impact of remittances after sovereign default,
this paper examines an unexplored potential determinant of economic stability. To
add on that, it also investigates a new channel through which remittances can affect
economic stability.
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
This section outlines sources and methods used to construct a database of sovereign
default and remittances. We base our empirical analysis on a panel of 81 developing
countries with annual data from 1990 to 2010. Country coverage is dictated by data
availability on main variables of interest, in particular remittances and default. As
part of robustness checks, we further restrict the sample by excluding former com-
munist countries, taking into account data from 1990-2008 to evaluate the impact
of the global financial crisis, excluding outliers, and further still by using regional
dummies as regressors. We measure remittances as a ratio to population thus remit-
tances are expressed in million USD per capita. We derive remittance series from
the World Bank Database (World Bank Indicators).
We use official population series to convert total remittances to a per capita series in
order to compare remittance receipts given different country sizes.3 It is worth noting
that gathering data on remittances is prone to measurement error since the data
usually underestimates the true remittance flows because remittances data captures
funds that flow through official channels, yet there is still more funds remitted
3Dividing remittances by population to obtain per capita series allows neutralizing effects of
variation in country sizes among our sample.
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through private channels which go unrecorded.
To begin with, we display visual data from defaulting countries by way of graphically
illustrating pre and post default behaviour of remittances as shown in Figure (1).
The graph shows five years of data whereby remittances data is normalized to one
and then graphically represented two years before and two years after the year of
default occurrence. The graphical representation shows that there is a tendency of
remittances to increase after default episodes as depicted by the upward sloping line
graphs after time zero which denotes the actual year of default. The data depicts
remittances-default nexus pre and post default episode and shows that remittances
pick up two years after the year of default occurrence.
Next, we examine these patterns to establish whether they hold up more system-
atically over a large sample of countries cutting across different continents. The
graph also shows an average line graph depicting the average remittances trend of
all the countries used in this study. Mean in t=2 is 1.98 points higher than in t=0.
The steep line graph represents Madagascar which experienced a huge leap in re-
mittance inflows after experiencing sovereign default in 2004. The high margin of
remittance inflows from 29 million USD in 2004 to 115 million USD in 2005 and a
further increment to 175 million USD account for the steep uppermost graph in Fig-
ure 1. In chapter 5, the three outlier countries (Madagascar, Rwanda and Guinea)
are excluded to assess the robustness of our findings.
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Figure 1: Remittance inflows pre and post default
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Notes : Year of default is normalized to zero. The figure shows a window of plus
and minus two years around a default. The flows have been normalized to one in
the year of default.
Consistent with much of the literature on sovereign defaults according to Cruces
and Trebesch (2013), and the practice of credit rating agencies as detailed out by
Beers and Chambers (2006), it is often considered that a default has occurred when
debt service is not paid on the due date (or within a specified grace period of time),
payments are not made within the time frame specified under a guarantee, or al-
ternatively, absent an outright payment default. Sometimes credit rating agencies
also consider a “technical” default an episode in which the sovereign makes a re-
structuring offer that contains less favorable terms than the original debt. It should
be noted that sovereign defaults do not necessarily imply total repudiation of out-
standing debt. In most cases, default episodes are usually followed by a settlement
between creditor and debtor although sometimes it may take the form of a debt
exchange or debt restructuring. The new stream of payments normally involves a
combination of lower principal, lower interest payments and longer maturities.
This study carries out regressions taking into account two default measures namely
Paris Club (Paris Club website) and CT defaults (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013) as
detailed out by Cruces and Trebesch. The former definition of sovereign default
refers to the renegotiation of official external debt through the Paris Club. We
follow Fuentes and Saravia (2010), Martinez and Sandleris (2011) and Brand and
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Jorra (2012) in using information from the Paris Club (2011) to construct different
indicators of sovereign defaults. Each default episode correspondingly reflects either
postponement or an outright reduction of a country’s debt service obligations owed
to other sovereign countries. Paris Club’s website is the most comprehensive data
source on sovereign defaults in terms of coverage and detail. Essentially, it comprises
more than 400 debt restructurings that took place between 1956 and 2010. For each
restructuring deal, there is information regarding the amount of debt rescheduled
and the type of treatment and as a result specifying degree of concessionality.
On the other hand, CT default episodes take into account distressed sovereign debt
restructurings with external private creditors (foreign commercial banks as well as
foreign bondholders). In this study, we consider both absolute values in original met-
ric and dummies of both default measures in order to test for robustness. Sovereign
defaults typically coincide with periods of economic hardship which renders the
crisis-stricken countries more needy. In principal, we expect a positive sign coeffi-
cient basing the results on the premise that when countries default, migrants are
meant to view it as a form of crisis or poor economic performance thus remit more
funds to cater for the well being of their family members back in their home coun-
tries.
Another important variable of interest is population. Growth in population implies a
corresponding increase in the number of citizens crossing borders for greener pastures
into another country. As a consequence, an upsurge of remittances goes hand in hand
with cross-border migration that is increasingly symptomatic of the demographic
shifts. Data on population is obtained from Penn World Table 8.1. Use of population
data also facilitates comparison of remittance receipts given the variant country sizes
in our sample.
The exchange rate also matters because it is expected that remitters take into ac-
count the value of domestic currency when they remit. An appreciation of the
domestic currency (remittance recipient country’s currency) is likely to reduce the
remittance proportion because it presents a form of extra cost for the remitter.
The converse therefore holds true since depreciation of domestic currency appears
cheaper to the migrants therefore leading to increased inward remittances. Data on
exchange rates is represented as the value of local national currency in terms of USD
for a period in national currency.
The human capital index measures countries’ ability to maximize and leverage their
human capital endowment. Human capital in terms of education, skills, knowledge,
age and health determines access to economic opportunities. Individual human
capital has been seen as a key determinant of migration probability and it has also
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been established that those with better education and skills have a comparative
advantage in destination labour markets and are more likely to migrate. When
better educated people emigrate, they earn more abroad and the resultant effect
is more remittances to their home countries because they can afford to send more
money back home.
Political stability and absence of violence index portrays political stability and ab-
sence of violence as the name suggests. This estimate is obtained from World Gover-
nance Indicators and it gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator in units
of a standard normal distribution. Better political structures allow for implementa-
tion of various strategies and that spurs on remittance flows.
Other variables of interest are GDP growth and GDP per capita. Low income coun-
tries are expected to receive relatively more remittances than high income countries
thus GDP per capita is negatively related to remittances. On the other hand, GDP
growth depicts the business cycle of the recipient country. Therefore, GDP growth
could either be positively or negatively related to remittance inflows depending on
the motive for remittance.
Natural disasters data is drawn from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (CRED), Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). We take into account
the top 10 disasters with the largest number of casualties.4 Migrants are presumed
to be empathetic therefore they look for means of bailing out their relatives back
home by remitting more whenever a huge disaster hits their home country.
Household consumption spending is mostly influenced by the amount of income
available to the households. Since remittances are meant to be a form of income
shock, they are expected to positively influence the consumption patterns of the
recipient household since their ability to spend is increased. Previous studies also
point out to the fact that remittances have a smoothing effect on consumption
instability. Consumption instability is driven by a complex array of factors including
economic shocks, the determinants of household elasticity with respect to shocks and
the determinants of household consumption elasticity with respect to household
income. Since remittances affect all the aforementioned factors, they are considered
to play a pertinent role in stabilization of household consumption.
OECD countries seem to be the ideal destination countries for most migrants from
developing countries thus economic growth in OECD countries implies that migrants
will be in a position to earn more and as a result remit more to their countries of
origin. Since variations in remittances is somehow influenced by economic condi-
4The sum of people affected and killed is used as an indicator of magnitude of a natural disaster.
Therefore we consider ten of the highest magnitudes exhibited.
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tions of the migrants’ host countries, the OECD growth rate is also included as an
additional regressor. Economic conditions in migrants’ host countries are likely to
affect the volume of remittance flows that migrants are able to send.
We use lagged values of various control variables that may influence the inflow of
remittances in order to address the problem of endogeneity. A comprehensive list
of countries and descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study are
presented in the appendix.5
4 Econometric Framework
We empirically examine the relationship between remittances and defaults using the
following model:
log
(
Remi,t
Popi,t
)
= β0Di,t−1 + β1X ′i,t−1 + εi,t,
where i refers to country and t refers to the time period from 1990 to 2010. However,
data for the entire time period is not available for all countries therefore we only
include countries if at least six years of data are available. Rem refers to remittances
while Pop refers to population, therefore the log of the ratio of remittances to
population is in this case our dependent variable which depicts respective countries’
reliance on remittances. The matrix X ′i,t is a matrix of control variables that the
literature has found to affect remittances and D is the indicator of default. We scale
the size of default by population to correspond with the treatment of the dependent
variable. β1 is a vector which includes coefficients on the control variables. β0 is the
coefficient of primary interest and the error term is denoted as εi,t .
The vector of standard control variables includes various other variables as follows:
GDP growth is taken into account because it shows the business cycle of the recipient
countries. Remittance trend of remitters could be quite ambiguous in the sense that
remittances may be countercyclical or procyclical depending on the motive behind
remittance flows. Remitters may want to remit more during economic downturn in
their home countries as a form of lending a hand or more still willing to remit larger
sums when the country is on a robust growth path taking advantage of investment
opportunities. We use lagged values of default measures in order to limit endogene-
ity. Lagged values also capture the effect of delayed response of remittances in the
5Comprehensive definition of variables, sources of data and descriptive statistics are presented
in the Appendix.
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aftermath of a sovereign default because remittances do not respond in real time
hence a time lapse lasting approximately a year.
We also use lagged values of the natural logarithm of the exchange rate to bring out
the effect that exchange rate movements in the preceding year influence remittances
in the current period. This is also explained by the fact that the exchange rate is
endogenous. We also use lagged values of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita
as well as disaster dummies since these are considered part of the regressors which
influence the magnitude of remittances. OECD growth rate, human capital index
and political stability and absence of violence index are also potential candidates
that impact on the flow of remittances. Growth in household consumption may also
influence the magnitude of remittance flows into the recipient economy whereby
higher household consumption may be associated with higher remittances.
The most outstanding problem is that the regressors are not strictly exogenous. We
therefore follow Ebeke and Combes (2013) by including lagged variables as opposed
to current realizations of most control variables.6 This should mitigate endogeneity
concerns. System GMM estimator allows for use of lagged differences and lagged
levels of the explanatory variables as instruments as illustrated by Arellano and
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM
estimations generally control for endogeneity of remittances and other explanatory
variables. In this case, there is one specification test that checks the validity of the
instruments. This is the standard Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions which
is based on the assumption that model parameters are identified via a priori restric-
tions on the coefficients and hence tests the validity of over-identifying restrictions.
The null hypothesis is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
If remittances increase when the recipient economy defaults, estimation of the remit-
tance impact by (OLS) is biased. Moreover the OLS estimator is inconsistent since
the lagged dependent variable is introduced besides country fixed-effects. However,
we carry out both GMM and fixed effects estimations in deriving initial baseline
results.7 We apply the Windmeijer finite sample correction to standard errors in
our GMM estimations in order to mitigate downward bias.
6GMM estimations takes into account lagged endogenous variables which are not captured when
fixed effects estimations are carried out.
7The main estimation method in this paper is Dynamic System GMM developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998). Fixed effects estimator is inconsistent in the presence of regressors that satisfy
contemporaneous but not strict exogeneity and is also considered to be downward biased.
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5 Empirical Evidence on the Role of Remittances
5.1 Baseline Results
In order to address the issue of endogeneity in remittances data due to reverse
causality, we initially conduct estimations lagging remittances per capita and other
regressors a maximum of four periods when we perform dynamic system GMM
estimations where we use lags of regressors as instruments.8
We follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in carrying
out GMM estimations. We run regressions using the one-step GMM estimator.
The main exogenous variables taken into consideration in this case include: OECD
growth, political stability, default and disasters. Endogenous variables consist of
human capital index, GDP growth, log of GDP per capita, household consumption
growth and log of exchange rate. Table 2 contains estimation results from GMM esti-
mations whereby the results derived from Paris Club yield the expected sign and are
statistically significant thus supporting the hypothesis that remittances significantly
increase in the aftermath of sovereign default and as such play a stabilizing role in
the recipient economies. A country suffering a default experiences, on average, an
increase in per-capita remittances of 0.24%.
Our GMM estimation results also display the Hansen J test of overidentifying re-
strictions. According to the Hansen J test statistics results, it is quite evident
from the values obtained that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term
and that excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
Hansen’s J statistic does not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are
valid. This test thus confirms the validity of our instruments because it confirms
that our instrument set is appropriate. In all our results we display z-statistics. Z-
test is a statistical procedure used to test an alternative hypothesis. This statistical
test is constructed using z-score which describes how much a point deviates from
the mean. A positive z-score implies that the data value is larger than the mean
whereas a negative z-score means that the data value is smaller than the mean. The
z-statistics results obtained lie within the acceptable range.
<< insert table 2 here >>
GMM approach is superior to fixed effects estimations because the OLS estimator
is inconsistent, therefore a lagged dependent variable is introduced besides country
fixed effects. However, measurement error is known to beset the balance of pay-
8To address the problem of endogeneity as well as instrument proliferation raised by the GMM
estimator, our matrix of instruments takes into account a maximum of four lags.
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ments statistics thus likely to bias our estimates. Biases might also occur because of
common omitted variables driving the behaviour of remittances and sovereign de-
faults. As a result, measurement error seems to be a persistent problem that cannot
be completely eliminated because even though GMM approach is used, they cannot
correct for biases arising from measurement error.
In our second approach, we examine the relationship between remittances and
sovereign defaults by running fixed effects regressions. In this instance we ignore
potential biases due to measurement error, omitted factors or reverse causation.
We use fixed effects because there’s high likelihood that unobserved characteristics
of remittance recipient countries characteristics correlate with variables of interest.
However, in fixed effects regressions the variable ∆OECD is omitted because the
model already takes into account period and country specific characteristics and
therefore inclusion of ∆OECD leads to syntax error.
<< insert table 3 here >>
Table 3 represents fixed effects estimations assuming that remittances are exogenous
and adequately measured. The adjusted R2 value which amounts to 0.84 depicts
that the model’s explanatory power is very strong. We find that defaults have a
positive sign when Paris Club data is used as a default measure. The results also
depict that whenever default occurs, then it is expected that the level of remittances
will significantly rise. This finding of a positive coefficient when Paris Club data
is used confirms our notion that increment in remittances emanate from sovereign
defaults episodes and thus play a central role in dampening the negative effects of
a default. The coefficient on CT default has the correct sign but is not statistically
significant. Regarding GDP growth, we find mixed evidence in favour of the hy-
pothesis that migrants respond to GDP growth fluctuations in their home countries
because apparently this entirely depends on the motive of remittance. On the one
hand, taking into consideration altruistic motive, migrants would remit funds when
the economic fundamentals in their home countries worsen. On the other hand
migrants who are motivated by favorable investment climate would remit during
periods in time whereby the economy is performing well and take advantage of the
prevailing investment opportunities.
The Paris Club data is deemed to be superior to other forms of default data owing
to the fact that the case selection and data collection for the Paris Club dataset
is straightforward. Moreover, it includes all bilateral debt restructurings under the
chairmanship of the Paris Club. On the flip side, CT criteria for default selection
tend to be limited in scope because the main attention is drawn to five criteria which
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include: only distressed restructurings, only restructurings with foreign private cred-
itors, no agreements on short-term debt, only public debt restructurings and only
finalized deals. As a result, we rely on the results exhibited when Paris Club data
is taken into account and therefore base our conclusions and recommendations on
the same.
5.2 Further Robustness Exercises
To verify the robustness of the GMM results obtained thus far we conduct a number
of additional estimations. Firstly, we exclude former communist countries because
of the negative impact of totalitarian control of the economy which hindered free
movement of capital thus inhibited remittance inflows. Secondly, we control for the
global financial crisis effect by taking into account only data ranging from 1990-
2008. Thirdly, to account for the presence of outliers, we drop observations for
Madagascar, Rwanda and Guinea. Fourthly, we introduce regional dummies to
prove that remittances per capita is not significantly higher in one region of the
world but in actual sense distributed across a wide range of developing countries in
various parts of the world.
Taking into consideration the first robustness exercise, exclusion of former com-
munist countries slightly alters our estimations results. The coefficient on default
measure increases by a margin of about 0.04%. Our results prove that indeed the
impact of remittances is felt to a greater extent in the aftermath of a sovereign
default and this effect cuts across a wide range of developing countries. This is
evidenced by the results shown on table 4.
<< insert table 4 here >>
Next we estimate the regression equation using data from 1990-2008 to analyze
whether the global financial crisis affected our initial results. Significant variation of
remittance flows seems plausible given the fact that our sample includes the finan-
cial crisis period between 2008 and 2009. In like manner, estimates for 1990-2008
also yield estimation results similar to those encompassing the overall period. The
coefficient of 0.25% is slightly higher than the overall coefficient and it is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. We find that our estimation results are robust in the sense
that even during the global financial crisis period, remittance flows contributed to
stability. This is also evident from the fact that the overall coefficient captures the
global financial crisis phase, a period during which many capital flows plummeted
but remittances exhibited resilience.
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<< insert table 6 here >>
Excluding outliers does not change our results in any significant way. Table 7 shows
that both the significance and magnitude of remittances as well as the number of
defaults remain unchanged when we drop observations associated with the three
outliers composed of observations for Madagascar, Rwanda and Guinea. Defaults
continue to have a positive effect on remittances per capita as before. Paris Club data
in both original metric and the coefficient on the default dummy yield significant
results. In principle, the absolute value (original metric) of default measurement
is more accurate as compared to the use of dummy variables. In this case, our
estimation results hold taking into account both definitions thus highly supporting
the notion that remittances significantly increase in the aftermath of a sovereign
default with respect to a wide range of developing countries. Dummy variables are
deemed to be “artificial” variables and as such run the risk of picking up specification
errors from omitted variables. In light of the foregoing explanation highlighting the
dummy variables setback, we base our conclusions on the results yielded by the
absolute value default measure when conducting this form of robustness check.9 In
the table below, the three outlier countries (Madagascar, Rwanda and Guinea) are
excluded to assess the robustness of our findings.
<< insert table 7 here >>
Finally we rerun GMM estimations including regional dummies. To sum it up,
inclusion of regional dummies paves way for us to prove that our results hold for
all regions worldwide since the results depict that remittances per capita is not
significantly higher in one region of the world. According to the estimates on table
8, it is evident that all countries included in the sample which represent different
continental groups collectively contribute to the overall results.
<< insert table 8 here >>
9The fact that some default dummy results are not significant does not contrast our general
conclusions. Similar results can be obtained by using fixed effects estimations. These results are
available from the author upon request.
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6 Conclusions
The role of remittances in a broader developmental context continues to be an inter-
esting topic for many researchers. This paper uses a dynamic system panel GMM
estimator for a large set of countries, alternative default definitions and standard
control variables to examine the role of remittances in the aftermath of sovereign
defaults with respect to developing countries. In this research, special focus is on
the bolstering nature of remittances in the aftermath of a sovereign default. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first ones who empirically investigate the validity
of the assumption that sovereign defaults lead to an upsurge of remittance flows to
defaulting countries.
Using data from a wide range of developing countries and carrying out GMM esti-
mations yield results which indicate that occurrence of a default triggers an upsurge
of remittances to defaulting countries. This is mainly because migrants associate
default episodes with periods of economic hardships in their countries of origin and
therefore decide to remit more as a form of financial safety net for their relatives
to dampen possible volatility in consumption patterns. This increase is statistically
significant, leading us to conclude that indeed remittances play a pertinent role in
the aftermath of a sovereign default. Drawing inferences from our results, an in-
crease of 0.24% in remittances per capita occurs in the aftermath of a sovereign
default. Our findings are robust to different empirical model specifications and a
variety of robustness checks. Evaluating our findings with respect to economic sig-
nificance of the results, it is evident that the recipient households are likely to be
cushioned against the worsening economic fundamentals of the sovereign state in
default. Consequently, our findings confirm yet another channel through which re-
mittances promote stability in developing countries. However, it is worth noting
that migrants remit for different reasons that also depend on individual migrant’s
characteristics in addition to both the host and country of origin characteristics.
The findings of this paper also entail several policy implications. Given the stabi-
lizing nature of remittances, developing countries susceptible to sovereign defaults
are likely to benefit from fostering these flows through various means, for example,
pursuing policies that reduce transaction costs associated with international remit-
tances. It would also be important to reduce impediments to remittances by doing
away with multiple exchange rate regimes and avoiding taxation of remittances.
Furthermore, governments should be encouraged to pay external debt to avoid all
the negative consequences associated with sovereign defaults thus facilitate utiliza-
tion of remittances for additional developmental benefits in the recipient economies.
Regarding default episodes, countries should avoid defaults at all costs because on
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this basis, increased remittances ought to bring about more general stability to the
international economy.
Based on the stylized facts presented in this paper, we conclude that remittances
might have stabilizing features after episodes of sovereign defaults. This contributes
to literature revolving around the role of remittances in hedging recipient economies
against macroeconomic instability such as natural disaster, exchange rate instability,
systemic banking crisis, discretionary fiscal policy and agricultural shocks. The
findings provided in this paper therefore provide additional evidence of the beneficial
effects of remittances.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
log(Rem/Pop) 1701 2.8919 2.9188 9.5115 -4.3553
ParisDefault 1701 194.28 1704.9 37158 0.0000
CTDefault 1701 205.24 2509.9 60572 0.0000
ParisDummy 1701 0.1287 0.3350 1.0000 0.0000
CTDummy 1701 0.0400 0.1960 1.0000 0.0000
∆GDP 1693 3.7476 8.0680 106.28 -66.120
lnXr 1701 3.4640 3.6044 9.8316 -26.204
lnGDPpc 1701 7.8020 1.6093 10.388 -3.6026
disasters 1701 0.3228 0.4677 1.0000 0.0000
HCI 1323 2.1734 0.5392 3.2762 1.1286
PoliticalS 1701 -0.4926 0.8479 1.2059 -3.1848
∆cons 1701 541.49 352.35 1266 1.0000
∆OECD 1701 -0.0383 2.0101 6.5224 -3.7751
AF dummy 1701 0.4568 0.4983 1.0000 0.0000
LAC dummy 1701 0.2716 0.4449 1.0000 0.0000
EU dummy 1701 0.1235 0.3291 1.0000 0.0000
ME dummy 1701 0.0494 0.2167 1.0000 0.0000
AS dummy 1701 0.0988 0.2984 1.0000 0.0000
Notes : We derive the variables displayed from various sources and in certain occa-
sions transform them in order to facilitate our analysis.
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Table 2: Baseline Results (GMM)
GMM Results
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 2.43 -0.05
(×10−3) [2.59]∗∗ [−0.19]
default dummy 0.33 -0.02
[1.89]∗ [−0.08]
lnXr 0.62 0.60 0.66 0.68
(×10−1) [0.58] [0.56] [0.63] [0.64]
∆GDP 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.24
(×10−2) [0.05] [0.07] [0.04] [0.06]
lnGDPpc -0.38 -0.36 -0.31 -0.32
[−1.71]∗ [−1.71]∗ [−1.53] [−1.57]
disasters 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
[0.24] [0.40] [0.21] [0.27]
∆cons -2.32 -2.48 -2.24 -2.35
(×10−4) [−0.31] [−0.34] [−0.30] [−0.31]
HCI 1.66 1.61 1.45 1.48
[1.95]∗ [1.88]∗ [1.76]∗ [1.78]∗
PoliticalS 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12
[0.38] [0.51] [0.57] [0.54]
4OECD 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.33
(×10−2) [0.16] [0.18] [0.16] [0.16]
No. of Countries 81 81 81 81
No. of Observations 1260 1260 1260 1260
Hansen test 0.683 0.704 0.590 0.563
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3: Baseline Results (Fixed Effects)
Fixed Effects Results
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 0.42 0.01
(×10−3) [2.02]∗∗ [0.04]
default dummy 0.37 -0.85
(×10−2) [0.05] [−0.06]
lnXr 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
[2.32]∗∗ [2.34]∗∗ [2.33]∗∗ [2.34]∗∗
∆GDP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[2.16]∗∗ [2.27]∗∗ [2.30]∗∗ [2.30]∗∗
lnGDPpc -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
[−0.30] [−0.27] [−0.27] [−0.27]
disasters -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
[−0.39] [−0.37] [−0.37] [−0.38]
∆cons 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[1.31] [1.23] [1.23] [1.22]
HCI -4.18 -4.21 -4.21 -4.21
[−8.20]∗∗∗ [−8.33]∗∗∗ [−8.46]∗∗∗ [−8.36]∗∗∗
PoliticalS -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
[−0.34] [−0.36] [−0.37] [−0.36]
No. of Countries 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
No. of observations 904 904 904 904
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 4: Excluding transition countries (GMM)
GMM Results
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 2.82 0.01
(×10−3) [3.61]∗∗∗ [0.41]
default dummy 3.33 3.62
(×10−2) [1.80]∗ [0.16]
lnXr -0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.14
(×10−1) [−0.06] [−0.13] [−0.18] [−0.14]
∆GDP -5.73 -0.56 -0.02 -0.44
(×10−3) [−0.21] [−0.02] [−0.00] [−0.02]
lnGDPpc -0.17 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06
[−0.52] [−0.40] [−0.17] [−0.21]
disasters -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
[−0.64] [−0.33] [−0.32] [−0.29]
∆cons 1.99 2.69 3.33 3.25
(×10−4) [0.30] [0.38] [0.44] [0.43]
HCI 1.04 0.84 0.59 0.63
[0.90] [0.74] [0.53] [0.55]
PoliticalS 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
[0.39] [0.45] [0.46] [0.45]
4OECD 0.63 0.04 -0.13 -0.11
(×10−4) [0.42] [0.02] [−0.07] [−0.06]
No. of Countries 62 62 62 62
No. of Observations 960 960 960 960
Hansen test 0.965 0.949 0.980 0.973
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. In this regression, 19
former communist countries are excluded thus decreasing the sample size from 81
to 62 countries.
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Table 5: Excluding transition countries (Fixed Effects)
Fixed Effects Results
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 0.39 -0.02
(×10−3) [1.86]∗ [−0.11]
default dummy -0.07 0.01
[−0.88] [0.07]
lnXr 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
[1.77]∗ [1.86]∗ [1.80]∗ [1.81]∗
∆GDP 0.69 0.09 0.08 0.08
(×10−1) [0.64] [0.81] [0.75] [0.74]
lnGDPpc -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
[−3.97]∗ [−4.32]∗∗∗ [−4.17]∗∗∗ [−4.01]∗∗
disasters -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
[−1.27] [−1.24] [−1.24] [−1.25]
∆cons 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(×10−1) [0.21] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12]
HCI -2.76 -2.80 -2.80 -2.79
[−5.44]∗∗∗ [−5.53]∗∗∗ [−5.65]∗∗∗ [−5.62]∗∗∗
PoliticalS 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
[1.03] [1.01] [1.01] [1.00]
No. of Countries 62 62 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
No. of Observations 699 699 699 699
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. In this regression, 19
former communist countries are excluded thus decreasing the sample size from 81
to 62 countries.
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Table 6: Pre-crisis sample (GMM)
GMM Results
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 24.73 7.92
(×10−4) [2.61]∗∗∗ [0.63]
default dummy 0.34 -0.01
[1.82]∗ [−0.07]
lnXr 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.06
[0.51] [0.49] [1.04] [0.56]
∆GDP -0.08 0.07 -0.10 -0.03
(×10−2) [−0.02] [0.02] [−0.42] [−0.01]
lnGDPpc -0.39 -0.36 -0.31 -0.32
[−1.59] [−1.59] [−1.39] [−1.42]
disasters 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04
[0.26] [0.40] [0.25] [0.30]
∆cons -3.14 -2.96 -2.82 -2.93
(×10−4) [−0.38] [−0.36] [−0.33] [−0.34]
HCI 1.68 1.61 1.43 1.45
[1.87]∗ [1.81]∗ [1.67]∗ [1.69]∗
PoliticalS 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10
[0.22] [0.35] [0.41] [0.39]
4OECD 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.16
(×10−1) [0.38] [0.43] [0.41] [0.40]
No. of Countries 81 81 81 81
No. of Observations 1134 1134 1134 1134
Hansen test 0.509 0.515 0.453 0.483
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This regression takes into
account only data from 1990-2008 to evaluate the effect of the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis.
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Table 7: Excluding outliers (GMM)
GMM Results excluding outliers
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 26.28 -1.46
(×10−4) [3.79]∗∗∗ [−0.57]
default dummy 0.40 -0.10
[2.72]∗∗∗ [−0.44]
lnXr -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
[−0.61] [−0.69] [−0.52] [−0.51]
∆GDP -3.90 -0.37 -0.39 -0.40
(×10−1) [−1.32] [−1.28] [−1.33] [−1.33]
lnGDPpc -0.25 -0.19 -0.16 -0.17
[−1.16] [−0.88] [−0.74] [−0.75]
disasters 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07
[0.62] [0.70] [0.53] [0.54]
∆cons 5.11 4.79 5.57 5.54
(×10−4) [1.50] [1.43] [1.61] [1.59]
HCI 0.94 0.77 0.66 0.67
[1.28] [1.04] [0.88] [0.89]
PoliticalS -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
[−0.69] [−0.38] [−0.30] [−0.33]
4OECD 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18
(×10−1) [1.06] [1.10] [1.05] [1.05]
No. of Countries 78 78 78 78
No. of Observations 1240 1240 1240 1240
Hansen test 0.745 0.736 0.763 0.696
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. In this case we exclude
three outliers in our dataset which are Madagascar, Rwanda and Guinea.
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Table 8: Including regional dummies (GMM)
GMM Results including regional dummies
Variables ParisDefault ParisDummy CTDefault CTDummy
Dependent Variable : log
(
Rem
Pop
)
default/Pop 23.28 7.92
(×10−4) [2.67]∗∗∗ [0.63]
default dummy 1.09 1.45
[1.69]∗ [2.03]∗
lnXr 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09
[0.37] [0.30] [1.04] [0.60]
∆GDP 0.04 0.19 -0.10 -0.08(×10−1) [0.09] [0.43] [−0.42] [−0.20]
lnGDPpc -0.46 -0.43 -0.15 -0.24
[−1.26] [−1.15] [−0.32] [−0.51]
disasters -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01
[−0.19] [0.06] [−0.49] [0.09]
∆cons -3.13 -3.93 -4.27 -4.68(×10−4) [−0.42] [−0.57] [−0.97] [−0.66]
HCI 1.83 1.81 1.28 1.25
[1.47] [1.51] [1.02] [0.87]
PoliticalS 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.26
[1.28] [1.30] [1.62] [1.52]
4OECD 0.30 0.15 0.49 0.48
(×10−2) [0.14] [0.07] [0.25] [0.22]
AF dummy 0.85 0.60 -0.22 0.32
[1.05] [0.68] [−0.19] [0.32]
LAC dummy 0.63 0.52 -0.10 0.35
[0.76] [0.54] [−0.08] [0.34]
ME dummy 0.86 0.67 -0.20 0.38
[0.86] [0.62] [−0.12] [0.28]
AS dummy 0.29 0.09 -0.84 -0.15
[0.46] [0.15] [−0.87] [−0.20]
No. of Countries 81 81 81 81
No. of Observations 1260 1260 1260 1260
Hansen test 0.689 0.871 0.852 0.849
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The estimation results dis-
play various regional dummies categorized according to continents i.e Africa (AF ),
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Europe (EU), Middle East (ME) and Asia
(AS).
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A Country Coverage
Albania Croatia Jamaica Rwanda
Angola DR Congo Jordan Sao Tome and Principe
Antigua and Barbuda Djibouti Kenya Senegal
Argentina Dominica Kyrgystan Serbia
Belize Dominican Republic Liberia Sierra Leone
Benin Ecuador Madagascar Slovenia
Bolivia Egypt Malawi South Africa
Bosnia and Herzegovina El Salvador Mali Sri Lanka
Brazil Equatorial Guinea Mauritania Tanzania
Bulgaria Ethiopia Mexico Togo
Burkina Faso Gabon Moldova Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi Gambia Mozambique Uganda
Cambodia Georgia Niger Ukraine
Cameroon Ghana Nigeria Uruguay
Central African Republic Grenada Pakistan Venezuela
Chad Guatemala Panama Vietnam
Chile Guinea Paraguay Yemen
Comoros Guinea Bissau Peru Zambia
Congo Honduras Philippines
Costa Rica Indonesia Poland
Cote d’Ivoire Iraq Romania
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B Data Sources and Definitions
• Rem refers to remittance inflows from workers into the recipient economy
and this data is obtained from the World Bank. The remittances inflows
are denominated in million US $ which takes into account 2005 national prices
converted into international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.
• Pop denotes population and is taken from Penn World Table 1.1. Data availed
in Penn World Table reports population data by country from the World Bank
and United Nations sources and is denominated in million of population.
• ParisDefault refers to default indicators as documented on the Paris Club
Website. Absolute default values are denoted in million USD. The bivariate
variable in this case takes the notation ParisDummy whereby 1 is an indicator
that renegotiations through the Paris Club took place and zero if otherwise.
• CTDefault is data compiled by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) which takes into
account default episodes due to external debt renegotiation with foreign com-
mercial banks and foreign bondholders. This data is obtained from Christoph
Trebesch’s website which encompasses haircut data and debt restructuring
set running from 1970-2013. Default in absolute terms is measured in origi-
nal metric in million USD. The dummy indicator CTDummy is 1 whenever a
default befitting CT description occurs and zero if otherwise.
• lnXr connotes the natural logarithm of the exchange rate. The exchange rate
is expressed in terms of respective local national currency vs USD and the
data is obtained from Penn World Tables 8.1
• ∆GDP is growth in real GDP per capita and this data is taken from Penn
World Tables 8.1. Real GDP is at constant 2005 national prices in million
2005 USD.
• lnGDPpc refers to natural logarithm of real GDP per capita and this is ob-
tained from Penn World Tables. This is derived by dividing real GDP by
population.
• disasters is bivariate whereby it is 1 if there is a natural disaster that is ranked
among the top ten disasters with the largest number of casualties in a given
remittance recipient country and zero if otherwise. This natural disasters data
is obtained from CRED Emerging Events Database. CRED defines a disaster
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as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, implying a
request for external assistance (Noy, 2009; EM-DAT Glossary of terms).
• HCI refers to human capital index which measures countries’ ability to max-
imize and leverage their human capital endowment and is derived from Penn
World Tables.
• PoliticalS is an index which portrays political stability and absence of vio-
lence. This estimate is obtained from World Governance Indicators and gives
the country’s score on the aggregate indicator in units of a standard normal
distribution, i.e. ranging from -2.5 to 2.5.
• ∆cons is the growth rate of household consumption. This data is derived from
World Development Indicators database.
• ∆OECD measures the growth rate of OECD countries and the data is obtained
from the OECD website.
• AF dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country is located
on the African continent and zero otherwise.
• LAC dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country is
located within Latin America and Caribbean and zero otherwise.
• EU dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country is located
within Europe and zero otherwise.
• ME dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country is located
within Middle East and zero otherwise.
• AS dummy is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country is located
within Asia and zero otherwise.
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C Paris Club Default Episodes
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bolivia Argentina Argentina Albania Bulgaria Bolivia
Central Afr. Rep Benin Bolivia Benin Cameroon Camodia
Congo Bulgaria Brazil Burkina Faso Central Afr. Rep Cameroon
El Salvador Burkina Faso Bulgaria Costa Rica Congo Chad
Honduras Costa Rica Cameroon Guatemala Cote d’ Ivoire Croatia
Jamaica Cote d’ Ivoire Ecuador Jamaica Ecuador Gabon
Madagascar Dominican Republic Equitorial Guinea Mauritania Equitorial Guinea Guinea
Mozambique Egypt Ethiopia Mozambique Gabon Guinea Bissau
Niger Gabon Guinea Peru Indonesia Mauritania
Panama Jamaica Honduras Vietnam Jordan Senegal
Poland Nigeria Jordan Kenya Togo
Senegal Peru Mali Niger Uganda
Tanzania Philippines Sierra Leone Philippines
Togo Poland Tanzania Senegal
Trinidad & Tobago Senegal Togo Sierra Leone
Zambia Uganda
Zambia
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Benin Cameroon Albania Honduras Albania Bolivia
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Bolivia Jordan Benin Cameroon
Chad Guinea Bosnia & Herzegovina Mozambique Bosnia and Herzegovina Chad
Congo Jordan Central Afr. Rep Pakistan Burkina Faso Ethiopia
Ghana Madagascar Cote d’ Ivoire Zambia Djibouti Georgia
Honduras Tanzania Indonesia Ecuador Ghana
Mali Yemen Rwanda Gabon Guinea
Mozambique Senegal Indonesia Guinea Bissau
Niger Uganda Kenya Madagascar
Peru Madagascar Malawi
Sierra Leone Mali Mali
Yemen Mauritania Mozambique
Zambia Nigeria Niger
Sao Tome & Principe Pakistan
Senegal Serbia
Tanzania Sierra Leone
Uganda Ukraine
Yemen
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Burkina Faso Benin Burundi Burundi Cameroon Central Afr. Rep
Cote d’ Ivoire Ecuador Congo Dominican Republic Grenada Gambia
DR Congo Mali Dominican Republic Honduras Malawi Sao Tome & Principe
Ethiopia Ethiopia Indonesia Moldova Sierra Leone
Ghana Gabon Kyrgyzstan
Indonesia Georgia Nigeria
Jordan Ghana Rwanda
Kyrgyzstan Honduras Sao Tome & Principe
Mali Iraq Sri Lanka
Mauritania Kenya Zambia
Rwanda Madagascar
Senegal Niger
Sierra Leone Senegal
Tanzania
Zambia
2008 2009 2010
Congo Burundi Antigua & Barbuda
Djibouti Central Afr. Rep Congo
Gambia Comoros DR Congo
Guinea Cote d’Ivoire Guinea Bissau
Liberia Togo Liberia
Togo
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Abstract
Remittance inflows from overseas workers are an important source of for-
eign funding for developing and emerging economies. The literature is in-
conclusive about the cyclical nature of remittance inflows. To the extent
remittances are procyclical they pose a challenge to monetary policy: a tight-
ening of policy will be less effective if at the same time remittances increase
strongly. The same is true for a policy easing under exceptionally weak remit-
tance inflows. This paper estimates a series of nonlinear (smooth-transition)
local projections to study the effectiveness of monetary policy under differ-
ent remittance inflows regimes. The model is able to provide state-dependent
impulse response functions. We show that for Kenya, Mexico, Colombia and
the Philippines monetary policy indeed has a smaller domestic effect under
strong inflows of remittances. These results have important implications for
the design of inflation targeting in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Inflows of worker remittances are one of the most important sources of external fund-
ing for developing and emerging countries. Remittances have a wide array of effects
on the recipient economy. They tend to contribute to financial development, affect
business cycles and growth, and could lead to a Dutch Disease phenomenon, among
other macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences.1 In addition, remittance
flows are less volatile than other forms of private capital inflows.
To the extent remittances impact income, prices of goods and services, asset prices
and the financial system, they also interact, and potentially interfere, with monetary
policy. This is particularly true if remittance flows are procyclical with regard to the
home economy. The literature on the cyclical properties of inflows is inconclusive:
while some papers stress the countercyclical nature of remittances, see Frankel (2011)
and Buch and Kuckulenz (2010), others provide evidence for a procyclical behavior,
see Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007), or present mixed evidence, see Sayan (2006).2
It seems plausible that the cyclical properties are not constant over time. During
extraordinary economic stress such as sovereign defaults, severe recessions or natural
disasters remittances will serve as an automatic stabilizer and, as a result, are coun-
tercyclical.3 However, to the extent local GDP correlates positively with GDP in
the U.S. or in other advanced economies, both remittance outflows from host coun-
tries and inflows to home countries are procyclical. Remittances not only respond
to business cycles, but also promote a change in the cyclical patterns in develop-
ing countries. Barajas et al. (2012) find that remittances contribute to business
cycle synchronization between host and home countries, in particular of economic
downturns.
Procyclical inflows are particularly relevant for monetary policy: suppose a central
bank in a developing country pursues an inflation target and adjusts the short-term
interest rate in a way to achieve the target inflation rate. If the economy overheats,
that is, if growth is high and inflation is above target, the central bank will raise
its policy rate. If this economy at the same time experiences inflows of remittances,
that is if remittance inflows are procyclical, the contractionary effect of tighter mon-
etary policy could be dampened and even overturned. Likewise, if the economy is
depressed and the central bank lowers the interest rate in order to stimulate activity,
a sudden drop in remittance inflows can neutralize this expansionary policy move.
Taken together, large swings in remittances can impact the effectiveness of monetary
1See Chami et al. (2008) for a useful survey of the evidence.
2This literature is further discussed in the next section.
3Machasio (2016) studies the stabilizing role of remittance inflows after sovereign defaults.
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policy and the strength of monetary policy transmission, respectively. Based on the
policy-experience in the Philippines, Bayangos (2012, p. 386) notes
“...the increase in remittances will make monetary policy less effec-
tive. ... the increase in remittance inflows leads to an increase in liquidity
in the financial markets and to a downward pressure on the interest rate,
leading to the possibility that a monetary policy action will have to be
strong to counter these impacts.”
This loss in effectiveness of monetary policy under procyclical remittance inflows,
which has not yet been formally investigated, is studied in this paper. To analyze
this research question, we estimate a series of nonlinear empirical models in order to
obtain impulse response functions. These functions show the response of important
macroeconomic variables to a change in the short-term interest rate. Importantly,
we differentiate between a state with strong remittance inflows and one with weak
inflows. We show that the impulse response functions differ significantly across both
states.
The impulse response functions are derived from local-projections following Jorda`
(2005). One of the major advantages of local-projections over competing mod-
els, among them vector autoregressions, is that they can easily accomodate state-
dependent coefficients and, hence, state-dependent impulse-response functions, even
for relatively small sample sizes. We estimate two versions of the state-dependent
model: in the first the states are separated by appropriately defined dummy vari-
ables which reflect whether remittances growth is above the median growth rate or
not. In the extension, our second model, we allow for a smooth transition between
states driven by the growth rate of remittances.4 This is a generalization of the first
model since we do not impose an abrupt switch from one state to the other.
The models are estimated for four countries (Kenya, Mexico, Colombia and the
Philippines), all of which receive large and volatile inflows of remittances as impor-
tant sources of foreign financing. Although there are countries for which remittances
play an even more important role, i.e. Armenia or El Salvador, these countries typ-
ically lack the macroeconomic data we need for this study.
We show that indeed the effect of monetary policy on inflation and output is different
under strong remittance inflows. In particular, a monetary policy tightening has
significantly smaller effects on inflation and output in a state with high remittance
inflows. Likewise, a restrictive monetary policy shock leads to a larger appreciation
4Smooth transition local projection models have recently been applied by Tenreyro and Thwaites
(2016) and others to study whether the effects of monetary policy shocks depend on the state of
the business cycle.
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of the currency if, at the same time, remittances pour into the economy. The same
shock leads to a smaller increase in long-term bond yields under strong inflows of
workers’ remittances. Hence, we find that the transmission of monetary policy is
muted under exceptionally strong inflows.
A set of counterfactuals is constructed in order to exclude alternative explanations
of our findings. We show that the results are not due to the U.S. business cycle,
which drives remittances and affects the cycle in small open economies. Likewise,
we exclude an explanation based on the domestic business cycle. The results are
different from a model in which the effects of monetary policy are allowed to differ
between periods with growth rates being above or below the median.
The two papers closest to this study are Mandelman (2013) and Barajas et al.
(2016). The first author presents a general equilibrium model with a large variety
of frictions, among them credit constrained households. Based on Philippine data
he shows that remittance flows smooth the consumption path of credit constrained
households. He shows that a flexible exchange rate regime is preferable. While he
outlines the normative consequences of remittances for the design of policy regimes,
he does not directly address our empirical question. The second paper, Barajas et
al (2016), uses a reduced-form model to show that remittances lead to a decoupling
of monetary policy rates and credit conditions and this affects the transmission of
monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two links our research
to major strands of the literature. Section three introduces linear and nonlinear
local projections. The data used in this study is explained in section four. The
results and a couple of robustness checks are discussed in section five. Section six
generalizes the model to a smooth-transition model and section seven draws policy
conclusions from our results.
2 Related literature
There are various strands of the literature which explore the relationship between re-
mittances and domestic macroeconomic variables. Our paper is particularly related
to three of these branches.
The first, as mentioned in the introduction, a number of papers evaluate the effect
of remittances on business cycles. The evidence as regards the cyclical properties of
remittance inflows is mixed. Econometric results obtained by Frankel (2011) show
that remittances are countercyclical with respect to the income in workers’ country of
origin and procyclical with respect to income earned in the host country. According
4
to these results, remittances constitute a particularly valuable component of balance
of payments in domestic downturns or when international investors flee the country.
Similarly, Buch and Kuckulenz (2010) support the notion of the countercyclical
nature of remittance inflows.
This conclusion, however, is not generally shared in the literature. On the flip
side, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007) report the correlation between detrended global
remittances and detrended GDP and find that remittances are procyclical, albeit
to a lesser extent than exports, official aid and portfolio investment. Supporting
mixed evidence, Sayan (2006) studies 12 developing and emerging countries and
does not find general countercyclicality of remittance flows. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva
(2010) show that the cyclical properties of remittance inflows change over time.
Based on data from Mexico they conclude that there is no general cyclical pattern
of remittance inflows. Model-based evidence provided by Durdu and Sayan (2010)
is also inconclusive as the relative size of opposite effects on the cyclical nature is
unclear.
A second, very small strand of the literature studies the relationship between re-
mittances and monetary policy. According to model proposed by Vacaflores (2012),
higher levels of remittances alter the effectiveness of monetary policy. The typical
monetary injection leads to a decline in the nominal interest rate that raises in-
vestment but because it generates a wealth effect that initially reduces work effort,
it creates an initial drop in output before experiencing the typical hump-shaped
improvement. Higher levels of remittances accentuate the liquidity effect arising
from the monetary shock, increasing investment and capital, but also enable the
household to increase its leisure time. This negative effect on labor is large enough
to depress output over time. Using data for the Philippines, Mandelman (2013)
develops and estimates a heterogeneous agent model to analyze the role of mon-
etary policy in a small open economy subject to sizable remittance fluctuations.
His findings reveal that in a purely deterministic framework, a fixed exchange rate
regime avoids a rapid real appreciation and performs better for recipient households
facing an increasing trend for remittances. A flexible floating regime is therefore
preferred in the Philippine case when unanticipated shocks driving the business cy-
cle are considered. Bayangos (2012) is the only paper that touches explicitly on
the effectiveness of monetary policy. The author provides simulation results for the
Philippines suggesting that the monetary policy pass-through tends to moderate
once the impact of large remittance flows is taken into account.
The third strand addresses monetary policy in developing economies in general. In
evaluating monetary policy in remittance dependent economies, remittance inflows
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have been identified as interest-insensitive private transfers across international bor-
ders and that they expand balance sheets in the recipient countries directly.
However, given the challenging institutional, informational and high risk environ-
ment prevailing in these countries, banks prefer to invest the additional funds in safe
and liquid assets, including lending to government. As a result, liquidity in banks
becomes ample and their marginal cost of loanable funds becomes delinked from
movements in the policy rate, thereby weakening a major channel through which
changes in the policy rate are transmitted to the lending rate and lending behavior
by banks (Barajas et al, 2016). According to Mbutor (2010) while evaluating the
role of monetary policy in enhancing remittances for economic growth in Nigeria, he
posits that developing countries mostly require full package for growth enhancement
because fiscal and monetary policies are inextricable except in terms of instruments
and implementing authorities. Nevertheless, monetary policy appears more potent
in correcting short term macroeconomic maladjustments because of the frequency
in applying and altering the policy tools, relative ease of its decision process and the
sheer nature of the financial system.
3 Local projections
In this paper we derive impulse response functions from local projections as sug-
gested by Jorda` (2005). Rather than estimating a full dynamic model for several
endogenous variables such as a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, our method rests
on a single equation model. The interpretation of an impulse response function in
terms of the response of a forecast of a variable h periods ahead to a shock in t is
identical in both modelling approaches. We will introduce the linear local projection
first followed by the nonlinear model, which is our main tool in this paper.
3.1 Linear model
We start with a series of regressions of a dependent variable dated t+h on a driving
variable dated t as well as a set of control variables. Our estimated model is the
following
yt+h = αh + βhRt + γ
′
h
q∑
s=1
xt−s + δ′h
q∑
s=1
zt−s + εt+h, (1)
where yt is the dependent variable, xt is a vector of domestic variables that poten-
tially drive yt and zt is a vector of foreign variables. We include up to q lags of
domestic and foreign control variables. The measure of monetary policy, which in
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our case is the short term interest rate, is denoted by Rt. Hence, the coefficient βh
measures the impact of a change in policy at t on the dependent variable h periods
ahead. Plotting βh as a function of h results in an impulse response function.
The model is estimated for Kenya, Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines. These
countries have been chosen because they are known to be strongly affected by re-
mittance inflows from abroad. We use four alternative dependent variables: the
log of real GDP, the log of the CPI, the log of the exchange rate against the U.S.
dollar and the yield on long-term government bonds. These variables are assumed
to characterize the transmission process of monetary policy.
The domestic control variables are real GDP, CPI, and the exchange rate. All models
other than the model for bond yields include the log of U.S. real GDP, the log of
global food prices and the log of remittance inflows as a foreign control variable.
All three foreign control variables reflect the high dependency of developing and
emerging countries on the global business cycle as well as the importance of global
food prices for domestic inflation. We include only one lag of the control variables,
that is, we set q = 1.5 Due to the fact that the dependent variable is h periods
ahead, the error terms will exhibit serial correlation. We therefore apply a Newey-
West correction to our estimation errors, which we use to construct a confidence
band around the estimated series of βh coefficients. As suggested by Jorda` (2005),
the maximum lag for the Newey-West correction is set to h+ 1.
Our measure of Rt is the short-term interest rate. The short-term interest rate
should summarize the overall policy stance. In all four countries the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rate is not a binding constraint. As a matter of fact, a
change in the short-term rate is not necessarily a policy shock as this change could
have been anticipated based on the knowledge of the state of the economy and the
central bank’s reaction function. However, we do not believe this is a large problem
for our analysis as (1) the policy frameworks of all four central banks included in
our study are less transparent than in advanced economies such that anticipating
policy moves is more difficult and (2) the macroeconomic control variables at least
to some extent capture the endogenous response of monetary policy to the state of
the economy.
There are several advantages of local projections as compared to VAR models: (1)
The model requires estimating only a handful of parameters. Thus, it is particularly
suited for a situation in which the length of available time series is short such as in
developing countries. (2) Since we do not need to estimate a complete system, the
model is more robust with regard to model uncertainty. This should result in more
5The model for real GDP and the CPI also includes a time trend.
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robust estimates.
3.2 Nonlinear model
Another key advantage of local projections over competing VAR models is that they
allow us to study non-linearities in the monetary transmission process easily.6
Suppose there are two observable regimes, I and II, that govern the impact of mon-
etary policy. We construct a dummy variable, It, which is one if the economy is in
regime I and zero if the economy is in regime II. For It = 1 ∀ t the model collapses
to the linear benchmark.
The model can easily be generalized to encompass regime-dependent dynamics
yt+h = It−1
[
αIh + β
I
hRt +
(
γIh
)′ q∑
s=1
xt−s
]
(2)
+ (1− It−1)
[
αIIh + β
II
h Rt +
(
γIIh
)′ q∑
s=1
xt−s
]
+ (δh)
′
q∑
s=1
zt−s + εt+h.
In this regression model, the constant, the coefficient on the monetary policy variable
and the coefficient on the domestic control variables are allowed to be regime-specific.
The foreign control variables are assumed to have a regime-invariant effect in order
to maintain a relatively parsimonious model.7
In our case let regime I be a state of the world with remittance growth above the
median. In contrast, regime II exhibits below-mean inflows of remittances. Hence,
both regimes are observable, which differentiates the model from models of unob-
servable regimes such as Markov-switching models. We assess whether the impact
of monetary policy is different in regimes with high growth rates of remittances.
Hence, the two regimes are the following
It =
{
1 if vt > τ
0 if vt ≤ τ,
where τ is the country-specific median of the year-on-year growth rate of remittance
inflows, vt. Hence, β
I
h reflects the impact of monetary policy on the endogenous
variables in a regime with high remittance inflows and βIIh stands for the effect of
6Nonlinear local projections have among others, been applied by Ramey and Zubairy (2014) in
their study of fiscal multipliers in booms and recessions, by Nodari (2015) in order to estimate the
effect of credit supply shocks in different stages of the business cycle and by Caselli and Roitman
(2016) who study the nonlinear interest rate pass-through.
7As in Ramey and Zubairy (2014) and others we use the lagged indicator function, It−1, in this
model. Using It instead would not change our results.
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monetary policy if remittance inflows are subdued.8 While we use the median of
the growth rate of remittances as a critical value to separate regimes, the critical
value could also be set differently. The higher the critical value, the more extreme
are the remittance inflows scenarios captured and the larger is the difference in the
estimated βh coefficients across regimes.
As mentioned by Ramey and Zubairy (2014), the procedure for calculating impulse
responses involves no iterations. For each horizon h a new regression is estimated.
In contrast to other kinds of regime-dependent impulse response functions, such as
the ones obtained from Markov Switching models, we do not need to assume that a
given regime prevails for the entire duration of the response.
4 Data
We investigate nonlinear monetary policy transmission in the presence of remittances
in four developing countries which are known to be strongly affected by remittance
inflows. We estimate the model for Kenya, Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines
during the period 2000Q1-2015Q4. The choice of the sample period is dictated by
data availability.
Table (1) provides some descriptive statistics on remittance inflows into the sample
countries. The countries strongly vary according to the magnitude of inflows relative
to their economic size. The list of the most important source countries of inflows
reveals the overwhelming influence of the U.S., which is why we pay special attention
to the U.S. business cycle as a potential alternative explanation for our findings.
While Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines have adopted a formal inflation tar-
geting regime, the Central Bank of Kenya pursues price stability without a formal
inflation target. All four economies have a floating exchange rate. Thus, we are
confident the small empirical model captures the monetary transmission process re-
alistically. The main variables of interest characterizing the monetary transmission
process are CPI, real GDP, the yield on long term government bonds, the short-term
interest rate and the exchange rate against the U.S dollar.
We seasonally adjust CPI and real GDP and express them in natural logarithms.
We use the Census X12 method to seasonally adjust our series. The exchange rate,
which we also use in natural logs, is defined as local currency per U.S dollar. The
data sources and details for each country are given in the appendix.
The model includes also two variables capturing global economic conditions which
8We restrict ourselves to two regimes since we only have a relatively short sample with quarterly
data.
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are of particular relevance for developing and emerging economies. These variables
are, first, the log-level of U.S. real GDP and, second, the log-level of the global food
price index.9
A crucial variable is the inflows of remittances. For all four economies we use
remittance inflows in U.S. dollars from the rest of the world. Again, details about
each series can be found in the appendix. Remittances are used to separate two
distinct regimes. We calculate the year-on-year growth rate in remittances to study
swings in inflows since the quarter-on-quarter growth rates would be far too volatile.
The dummy variable for the identification of states is set to one if the growth rate
is higher than a critical value τ , which is the median of remittances growth.10 We
restrict the analysis to two regimes exhibiting high and low growth of remittance
inflows. This is due to the short sample period available. We also use the log of
remittances as a control variable in each regression.
Figure (1) shows the year-on-year growth rate of remittance inflows for all four
economies. In addition, the horizontal line reflects the median growth rate of re-
mittance inflows. The shaded areas are periods in which remittances growth lies
above the median growth rate. In can be seen that all four economies experienced
large swings in remittance inflows. Moreover, these swings do not appear to be
synchronized across countries.
5 Results and robustness
The results are presented in three steps. First, we discuss the evidence from linear
local projections. Second, we shed light on the nonlinear nature of the transmis-
sion process due to large swings in remittance inflows. In a third step, we present
counterfactual results to corroborate the robustness of our findings.
5.1 Results from linear model
Figures (2) to (5) present the results from the estimated linear model. For each
endogenous variable we show the coefficient on monetary policy as a function of the
horizon h. The point estimates are surrounded by 90% confidence bands.
Figure (2) displays the linear model for Kenya. A one percentage point increase to
the Kenyan short-term interest rate leads to a hump-shaped fall in domestic prices.
While prices start to decline immediately, output starts to fall after six quarters.
9Both variables are obtained from the FRED database.
10Using the mean instead would result in virtually identical results. Results for a higher critical
value, e.g. the mean plus half the standard deviation of remittances, are available upon request.
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Following the monetary tightening, the Kenyan currency appreciates against the
U.S. dollar. If the short-term interest rate rises by one percentage point, the yield
on long term bonds also increases by a quarter of a percentage point, thus the
yield curve becomes flatter. These results are in line with our expectations and
support the view that the transmission process in Kenya is similar to other small
open economies.
Mexico’s results are presented in Figure (3). In contrast to Kenya’s case, prices are
less sensitive to monetary policy and fall only moderately after three quarters. The
response of real GDP is consistent with this as output exhibits no significant drop
after a monetary tightening. As for the exchange rate, the interest rate increase leads
to an appreciation of the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar. The response of the
long-term interest rate is positive, as in the case of Kenya, and highly significant.
Again, the slope of the term structure flattens after the policy tightening.
Figure (4) shows the response of the endogenous variables to the short-term interest
rate in Colombia. Prices and output respond immediately and decrease in their
respective values after the interest rate increase. As expected, a policy tightening
is contractionary as regards output and prices. While the exchange rate response
is insignificant, the response of long-term interest rates is again consistent with the
textbook model of monetary policy transmission.
Finally, the results for the Philippines are shown in Figure (5). Initially, Philippine
prices seem to be insensitive to policy though prices start to fall eight quarters after
the interest rate shock. As in Mexico and Kenya, output responds immediately and
falls persistently reaching the maximum response after six or seven quarters. The
interest rate increase raises the value of the Philippine Peso against the U.S. dollar,
though this response becomes significant a year after the initial shock. As in all
other countries, yields on long-term bonds increase when the central bank tightens.
In all four countries, the transmission of policy impulses follows the textbook model
of monetary policy in small open economies under (de facto) inflation targeting.
Thus, the four countries highlighted here are well suited to study how strong swings
in remittance inflows affect the transmission of policy.
5.2 Results from nonlinear model
The impulse responses from the nonlinear model are shown in Figures (6), (7), (8)
and (9). In each figure, we report the impulse responses and the corresponding
90% confidence intervals for the two states. The responses to monetary policy if
remittance inflows are high, hence the economy is in state I, are shown by the
dotted green line. The responses for state II, a situation with remittance inflows
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being below the median, are shown by the dotted black line.
For all four countries, the fluctuations in state I are less pronounced than in state
II. This implies that the endogenous variables react more strongly to monetary
policy during low growth of remittances than during periods when a country receives
high remittances suggesting that transmission of monetary policy is muted under
exceptionally strong remittance inflows.
The difference between high remittances and low remittances is seen most clearly
when prices and output are taken into account. Prices and output react more
strongly when countries experience low remittance flows than when they receive
high remittance inflows.
According to Figure (6), following a policy tightening prices in Kenya fall by approx-
imately 0.1% in state I. When the economy is in state II, however, the same policy
impulse leads prices to fall by 0.5%. The same pattern can be observed for output.
Under strong remittance inflows, monetary policy depresses output by about 0.1%,
while under low inflows policy triggers a contraction of 0.5%.
In the linear model presented before, the exchange rate appreciated against the U.S.
dollar after the policy tightening. We expect the appreciation to le larger when, at
the time of the policy shock, large amounts of remittances flow into the country.
This is indeed what we observe for the case of Kenya.
Strong remittance inflows tend to increase liquidity and thus reduce long-term inter-
est rates. Thus we expect a policy tightening to have a smaller effect on long-term
interest rates in state I compared to state II with weak remittance inflows. For
Kenya, see Figure (6), bond yields indeed increase strongly in state II and barely
respond to monetary policy in state I.
For Mexico, see Figure (7), we see a similar pattern. In state I, monetary policy is less
contractionary than under state II. Furthermore, under weak inflows of remittances,
monetary policy has only a very small effect on the exchange rate. The response
fluctuates around zero such that the cumulative response is insignificant. In state I,
however, when the demand of overseas workers for the domestic currency multiplies
the the effects of the policy tightening, we see a significant appreciation of the
Mexican peso. Bond yields fall if remittances pour in and more than offset the
effect of the policy tightening, while they clearly increase in state II.
For Colombia, see Figure (8), the state-dependent impulse responses are significantly
different, although the difference between the two states is smaller than for Kenya
and Mexico. Again, the policy tightening is less effective in state I. While there
seems to be no state-dependence of the exchange rate response, bond yields exhibit
a negative response in state I and the standard response, which we could observe in
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the linear model, in state II.
Figure (9) for the Philippines shows that in regime I, prices increase rather than
decrease following the shock. Output, however, does not respond differently across
both states, although there is a small tendency for policy being less contractionary
in state I. The exchange rate response is not in line with our expectations: we find
the exchange rate to depreciate in state I and to slightly appreciate in state II.
However, the response of bond yields is again consistent with the overall pattern
shown in this paper.
Taken together we see evidence for a reduction in the effectiveness of monetary policy
under strong inflows of remittances. A monetary policy shock is less contractionary
if at the same time the economy receives large inflows of remittances.
Figure (10) gives a summary of the baseline results. For output and inflation in each
country we calculate the cumulative impulse response in each of the two states. We
then calculate the differences between the cumulative response in state I and state II.
The higher the resulting number, the larger is the difference in policy effectiveness
with policy having a larger effect in state II. The resulting four observations for
output and inflation, respectively, are shown in a scatter plot against the standard
deviation of remittances flows.
A few observations stand out: first, in all four countries the difference is positive.
Second, with the exception of Mexico, the difference is larger for inflation than for
output. Third, again with the exception of Mexico, the differences for both variables
increase with the standard deviation of remittances. While we should be careful not
to over-interpret the findings based on four countries only, this plausible finding
highlights the role played by the volatility of remittances inflows. We will elaborate
this further in the concluding section.
5.3 Robustness
In this section we provide additional results which underline the hypothesis of less
powerful monetary policy in periods of strong remittances inflows. The robustness
checks are meant to rule out alternative explanations which would result in obser-
vationally equivalent findings.
The first explanation could be that the results presented in the previous section
reflect the domestic business cycle. In fact, if remittances are countercyclical, they
should strongly flow into the economy during recessions and less strongly in boom
periods. For the U.S. economy, Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) show that monetary
policy is more effective in booms rather than recessions. If, by measuring remittances
inflows, we indirectly capture the domestic cycle, our findings would be similar.
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To rule out this competing explanation, we construct a counterfactual. We re-
estimate the model with the regime-dummies now reflecting the domestic cycle. In
particular, It equals one if the domestic GDP growth rate is below the median and
zero otherwise. To save space, we do not report the entire set of impulse responses
again. Instead, we summarize the information content by showing the cumulative
impulse responses over h = 0, ..., 12 as a single number in Table (2).11 We report the
results for prices and GDP only since these are the core variables for gauging the
effectiveness of monetary policy. The table also contains the cumulative responses
of the linear model and the benchmark nonlinear model, respectively.
We would rule out an alternative explanation for our findings if (1) the resulting
cumulative responses are not different across regimes or (2) the relative magnitudes
of the responses are inconsistent. The former would be the case if one of the two
cumulative responses lies in the confidence band around the other response. The
latter would be the case if, for example, prices respond more strongly in state I while
output is more sensitive to monetary policy in state II.
For Kenya, we find that the response of prices, which is -2.29% in state II, lies in the
90% confidence interval around the cumulative estimate in state I. Hence, the price
responses are not not statistically distinguishable. Likewise, the output response in
state II, which is -1.38%, lies in the confidence band around the estimate for state I.
Hence, the estimation based on the domestic cycle does not result in a significantly
different transmission mechanism and, as a result, speaks against the domestic cycle
being an explanation for our findings.
For Mexico, each price response lies in the confidence band of the other response.
The same is true for the output responses. Hence, we can also exclude the alternative
explanation. In the case of Colombia, both the price and the output responses of
state I are not distinguishable from the responses in state II. Hence, the alternative
explanation can be discarded. The same is true for the Philippines. These findings
strengthen the case for remittances inflows being the source of policy ineffectiveness.
The second alternative explanation is that with two states of remittances inflows
we simply capture the U.S business cycle or the cycle in advanced economies, re-
spectively. A reduction in policy effectiveness in Kenya could simply be the result
of Kenya being positively affected by high export demand from the U.S. In this
case monetary policy has less grip on domestic demand, which instead is driven by
booming economies abroad. If a boom in the U.S. allows workers to transfer higher
11As a matter of fact, the cumulative responses are just one way to summarize the impulse
response functions. A typical caveat is that the cumulative response contains no information about
the shape of the response, e.g. the hump-shaped response of most macroeconomic aggregates.
Hence, the cumulative number discussed here should be interpreted with some caution.
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remittances, the resulting impulse responses would be observationally equivalent to
our benchmark model.
To rule out this explanation, we run the model presented before with an important
modification: now the indicator variable It is one if the growth rate of the U.S.
economy is above its median and is zero otherwise. The results are shown in the
fourth row for each country in Table (2). For Kenya, the responses of prices and
output are again indistinguishable as each response lies in the confidence band of
the other. The same can be observed for Colombia and the Philippines.
For Mexico, however, we find that the U.S. cycle leads to significantly different price
and output responses in the two regimes. However, here our second criterion spelled
out before applies: the response are inconsistent across variables, thus speaking
against the U.S. cycle being an explanation for our findings. In particular, prices
appear to be more sensitive to monetary policy in state I while output increases in
state I and falls in state II after a policy tightening. Hence, as regards output policy
is more effective in state II. Based on this inconsistency, we also rule out the U.S.
business cycle as a competing explanation for our results.
It could also be argued that the economy is not jumping between different states
but rather adjusting gradually to changes in remittances inflows. Since we need to
modify the models to account for a smooth transition between states, we devote a
separate section to this robustness check.
6 Evidence from smooth-transition local projec-
tions
The model estimated before allows for two distinct states with an abrupt transition
between them. If the economy experiences a growth rate which crosses the median,
the economy immediately jumps from state II to state I. This is a strong assumption
which we now want to relax. We draw on the work of Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016)
and Born et al. (2016), among others, and combine state-dependent local projections
with a smooth transition between states. While these models haven been used to
study fiscal multipliers and monetary policy shocks in advanced economies during
expansionary and contractionary periods, they have not been applied to small open
economies.
The estimated smooth-transition local projection (STLP) model is
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yt+h = F (vt−1)
[
αIh + β
I
hRt +
(
γIh
)′ q∑
s=1
xt−s
]
(3)
+ (1− F (vt−1))
[
αIIh + β
II
h Rt +
(
γIIh
)′ q∑
s=1
xt−s
]
+ δ′h
q∑
s=1
zt−s + εt+h,
where the transition function F (vt) has replaced the It dummy variable. Otherwise
the interpretation of the coefficients remains unchanged.
The term F (vt) determines in which of the two states the economy is as a function
of vt. The important difference with regard to the model in the previous section
is the fact that F (vt) is a smooth, increasing function of vt. In accordance to the
literature, this function is parameterized as a logistic function with
F (vt) = 1− 1
1 + exp(αvt)
, (4)
where vt is now the standardized and centered year-on-year growth rate of remit-
tances and α > 0. This function is bounded between zero and one. The parameter
α determines how sharp the transition between regimes is. In this application, as in
Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), we impose rather than estimate α. Specifically, we
set α = 3.12 Figure (11) plots F (vt) as a function of two alternative values for α. It
can be seen that α = 3 allows for a relatively smooth transition. For α → ∞, the
model immediately shifts from one state to the other if demeaned and standardized
remittance inflows cross zero. As a result, the model approaches the state-dependent
model from the previous sections.
For each country, the resulting probabilities of state I, the state with high remit-
tances growth, are plotted in Figure (12). An important difference with regard to
the state-dependent model estimated before is that the model allows economies to
be in the transition process towards state I or II, respectively. In this sense the
STLP model is a generalization of the state-dependent model. In fact, given the
relatively smooth evolution of macroeconomic variables, it is plausible to assume
that the economy gradually moves from one state to the other.
The impulse response functions are shown in Figures (13) to (16). For Kenya, see
Figure (13), the results of the smooth-transition model are very similar to those
from the model discussed in the previous section. Again, we find strong evidence
in favor of a state-dependent monetary transmission mechanism. In Mexico, the
smooth-transition results exhibit a smaller difference in the response of prices across
12Using alternative values for α does not change the results.
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regime than in the previous model. For the output response, see Figure (14), the
difference between the two states is larger. Under strong remittance inflows a one
percentage point increase in the interest will be expansionary, while under weak
remittance inflows the same shock causes a drop in GDP by 1% to 2%. Likewise,
the state-dependence of the response of the exchange rate is more pronounced in the
smooth-transition model. The results for Colombia and the Philippines, respectively,
see Figures (15) and (16), also support the previous set of results.
As a result of the previous discussion we can conclude that the state-dependence
of monetary policy effectiveness is relatively robust with respect to the way the
transition between states is modeled. All findings suggest that monetary policy
has a larger impact on inflation, output and long-term interest rates when remit-
tance inflows are low. In the high-remittances regime, the effectiveness is reduced
significantly.
7 Conclusions
Many developing and emerging countries strongly depend on remittance inflows from
overseas workers. In this paper we showed that these inflows reduce the effectiveness
of monetary policy. An interest rate increase is less contractionary in periods of
strong remittance inflows. Likewise, a policy easing implies less stimulus during
times with low remittance inflows. The results have been derived from a series
of state-dependent local projection models for Kenya, Mexico, Colombia and the
Philippines.
The interference of remittance inflows with monetary policy is a facet of the dilemma
of open-economy macroeconomic policy. As Rey (2013) argues, to the extent there
is a global cycle in financial flows which is decoupled from domestic conditions and
capital is free to flow in and out of countries, monetary policy at the national level is
constrained. Importantly, this is independent from the exchange rate regime, thus
turning the traditional trilemma of macro policy into a dilemma between openness
for capital inflows and independent monetary policy. Our results corroborate Rey’s
(2013) view for the special case of remittance inflows.
As a matter of fact, one way to escape the dilemma is to restrict the flow of capi-
tal. However, from the perspective of developing countries this is unwise given the
beneficial long-term impact of capital inflows including the inflow of remittances. In
particular, remittances have been shown to improve financial development (Aggar-
wal et al., 2011) and reduce poverty (Gupta et al., 2009), among other long-term
effects.
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Countries could also design policies to channel remittance inflows into long-term
growth enhancing investments such as human capital formation, institution-building
and infrastructure investments. The less remittance inflows drive up aggregate de-
mand, the more monetary policy is able to target inflation.
A second option is the design of monetary and financial stability policies, respec-
tively. The results have shown that ability of the central bank to target inflation
can be severely hampered if the economy experiences swings in remittances. For an
inflation targeting central bank this means that policy should take remittance flows
into account when setting policy and, to the extent possible, scale their policy step
accordingly. To elicit the same effect on macroeconomic aggregates, a more bold
interest rate step is needed if remittance inflows are high.
We have seen that, with the exception of Mexico, the state-dependence of policy
effectiveness increases with remittances volatility. This suggests that policies con-
ducive to stabilizing the inflow of remittances might also reduce the state-dependence
of monetary policy effectiveness.
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A Data Sources and Definitions
This appendix contains details about the data series used in this paper.
Kenya
The series for CPI and real GDP are obtained from the Kenya National Bureau of
Statistics website. The GDP series exhibits a structural break in the level in 2009
due to the rebasing of Kenyan national accounts. We use the pre-2009 growth rates
to extrapolate the post-2009 series backwards in order to overcome this problem.
Remittances data is obtained from Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) website. We in-
terpolate annual remittances series to obtain a quarterly series between 2000-2003.
Both the short-term interest rate and the exchange rates for Kenya are also obtained
from CBK website. The yield on long term government bond for each of the four
countries is obtained from investing.com, a global financial portal, and is expressed
in percentage points.
Mexico
Mexican CPI data is obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia.
We derive the real GDP series from Thomson Datastream while we rely on remit-
tance data from the Banco de Mexico website. We obtain both the short-term
interest rate and the exchange rate for Mexico from the FRED database.
Colombia
We obtain Colombian quarterly CPI series from Thomson Datastream. The Na-
tional Administrative Department of Statistics is the official statistical website for
Colombia and we extract real GDP series from this website. We obtain remittance
flows, the short term interest rate and the exchange rate from the Banco de la Re-
publica de Colombia website.
Philippines
The Philippine Statistics Authority is our source of Philippine CPI data. We obtain
real GDP series from Thomson Datastream. We obtain both remittances and the
short term interest rate data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas website. We
also obtain the exchange rate of the Philippine peso per U.S dollar from the Central
Bank of the Philippines website.
21
B Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Remittance inflows
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Notes: Quarterly year-on-year percentage changes in remittance inflows (in %) in red (solid line).
The green dotted line is the median growth rate. Shaded regions are episodes with above-median
growth rates.
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Figure 2: Kenya - Response to interest rate change
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Notes: The dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections. The shaded area reflects
a 90% confidence band around the point estimate.
Figure 3: Mexico - Response to interest rate change
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Notes: The dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections. The shaded area reflects
a 90% confidence band around the point estimate.
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Figure 4: Colombia - Response to interest rate change
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Notes: The dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections. The shaded area reflects
a 90% confidence band around the point estimate.
Figure 5: Philippines - Response to interest rate change
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Notes: The dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections. The shaded area reflects
a 90% confidence band around the point estimate.
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Figure 6: Kenya - State-dependent response to interest rate change
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections in regime
I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point estimate in state I
and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
Figure 7: Mexico - State-dependent response to interest rate change
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections in regime
I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point estimate in state I
and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
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Figure 8: Colombia - State-dependent response to interest rate change
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections in regime
I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point estimate in state I
and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
Figure 9: Philippines - State-dependent response to interest rate change
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on local projections in regime
I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point estimate in state I
and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
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Figure 10: Summary of baseline results
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
standard deviation of remittances
diff in output effects
diff in inflation effects
di
ffe
re
n
ce
 
be
tw
e
e
n
 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
in
 
I a
n
d 
II
K
e
nya
M
e
xico
Philippin
e
s
C
olo
m
bia
Notes: The scatter plot shows the differences in the cumulative output effects (blue dots) and
inflation effects (red crosses). In both cases, the difference is calculated as the response in state I
minus the response in state II. The differences are plotted against the sample standard deviation
of remittance inflows.
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Figure 11: Transition functions
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Notes: Calibrated logistic transition functions for alternative values of α. The horizontal axis mea-
sures centered and standardized remittances growth and the vertical axis depicts the probability
of being in state I.
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Figure 12: Probability of high-remittances inflow state
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Notes: The red line is the probability of being in state I (right scale). The grey line is the quarterly
year-on-year growth rate of remittances (left scale).
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Figure 13: Kenya - State-dependent response to interest rate change from STLP
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on smooth-transition local
projections in regime I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point
estimate in state I and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
Figure 14: Mexico - State-dependent response to interest rate change from STLP
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on smooth-transition local
projections in regime I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point
estimate in state I and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
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Figure 15: Colombia - State-dependent response to interest rate change from STLP
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on smooth-transition local
projections in regime I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point
estimate in state I and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
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.Figure 16: Philippines - State-dependent response to interest rate change from STLP
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Notes: The green (black) dotted line is the impulse response based on smooth-transition local
projections in regime I (II). The grey shaded area reflects a 90% confidence band around the point
estimate in state I and the red solid lines reflect the confidence band in state II.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on remittance inflows
Kenya Mexico Colombia Philippines
total inflows (2015, in mil USD)
1,560 26,233 4,680 28,483
as share of GDP (2015)
2.5% 2.3% 1.6% 9.8%
main source countries
UK (33%) USA (98%) USA (31%) USA (34%)
USA (30%) CAN (<1%) VEN (30%) UAE (12%)
TAN (7%) ESP (<1%) ESP (15%) KSA (11%)
CAN (6%) ECU (6%) CAN (7%)
UGA (5%) CAN (2%) MAS (6%)
Notes: The table shows the volume of remittance inflows in absolute terms as well as relative to
GDP. We also give the main source countries for inflows. All data comes from the Worldbank.
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Table 2: Cumulative impulse response functions for alternative models
Prices Output
I II I II
Kenya
linear −2.05
[−3.30,−0.80]
−0.80
[−2.00,0.39]
baseline −1.12
[−1.66,−0.59]
−3.92
[−5.33,−2.50]
−0.28
[−1.13,0.57]
−1.89
[−3.82,0.05]
domestic cycle −2.24
[−3.57,−0.91]
−2.29
[−3.62,−0.96]
−0.80
[−2.15,0.55]
−1.38
[−2.81,0.04]
U.S. cycle −2.26
[−3.82,−0.70]
−1.74
[−2.94,−0.54]
−1.44
[−3.19,0.30]
−0.75
[−1.56,0.05]
Mexico
linear −0.21
[−0.69,0.26]
−0.15
[−1.53,1.23]
baseline −1.02
[−1.61,−0.42]
−1.92
[−2.48,−1.36]
1.55
[−0.30,3.41]
−0.48
[−4.38,3.42]
domestic cycle −0.06
[−0.63,0.51]
−0.50
[−1.17,0.17]
−1.01
[−3.04,1.03]
−0.78
[−3.27,1.70]
U.S. cycle −1.74
[−2.27,−1.21]
−0.14
[−0.67,0.38]
3.07
[1.05,5.09]
−0.59
[−1.95,0.77]
Colombia
linear −1.62
[−2.31,−0.93]
−4.07
[−4.92,−3.22]
baseline −0.98
[−1.77,−0.18]
−2.05
[−2.69,−1.42]
−3.41
[−5.02,−1.80]
−4.05
[−4.99,−3.11]
domestic cycle −1.74
[−2.24,−1.24]
−1.35
[−2.21,−0.50]
−3.44
[−4.26,−2.62]
−4.84
[−6.34,−3.34]
U.S. cycle −1.66
[−2.67,−0.64]
−1.58
[−2.21,−0.95]
−3.18
[−4.92,−1.45]
−3.50
[−4.26,−2.73]
Philippines
linear −0.32
[−1.35,0.71]
−2.50
[−3.56,−1.44]
baseline 0.81
[−1.21,2.83]
−1.24
[−2.22,−0.26]
−2.44
[−4.06,−0.82]
−3.39
[−4.82,−1.96]
domestic cycle −0.57
[−1.68,0.53]
−1.38
[−2.89,0.13]
−3.82
[−5.66,−1.97]
−2.03
[−3.15,−0.91]
U.S. cycle 0.81
[−1.15,2.78]
−0.32
[−1.22,0.58]
−3.01
[−4.47,−1.56]
−3.08
[−4.36,−1.79]
Notes: The table reports impulse response functions which are accumulated over 12 periods. The
confidence band (in brackets), is the cumulative upper and lower bound, respectively, over 12
periods. ”Domestic cycle” refers to a model which is in state I if the domestic GDP growth rate
is below the median. ”U.S. cycle” is a model which is in state I if U.S. output growth is above its
median. ”Linear” and ”baseline” are the models from section 3.
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1 Introduction
Owing to their scale and properties, international migrants’ remittances have at-
tracted a lot of attention from policy makers and researchers. Remittances rank
second after FDI in terms of capital flows to developing countries, exceeding both
official development assistance and portfolio investment. According to the latest
edition of the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief released on October
3, 2017, remittances to low and middle income countries are on course to recover
in 2017 after two consecutive years of decline.1 According to World Bank esti-
mates, officially recorded remittances to developing countries are projected to grow
by 4.8% to US$450 billion for 2017. The recovery in remittance flows is attributed
to relatively stronger growth in advanced economies.
Remittances are regarded as a lifeline for many developing countries. This is be-
cause remittances provide a relatively stable source of capital inflows that foster
economic development and potentially also smooth the business cycle. The lat-
ter effect of remittances hinges on their cyclical nature. Countercyclical remittance
inflows allow households in low income countries to smooth consumption despite ad-
verse income shocks resulting from global changes in food prices, natural disasters,
political turmoil, drought and many other factors. Procyclical remittances, in con-
trast, exacerbate income fluctuations. Hence, a large branch of research investigates
the cyclical properties of remittance inflows.
Theoretically, there are arguments for countercyclical as well as procyclical remit-
tances, respectively. Altruistic motives of migrants, which are often considered the
main driver of remittances, lead to financial support for their families living in the
home country. The flows resulting from altruistic motives should be countercyclical,
i.e. they should increase if economic hardship hits the home economy. Income and
employment in the host countries give migrants the necessary means to transfer a
fraction of their income to their home economy. Therefore, migrants are more likely
to transfer money during economic expansions compared to downturns. If income
in the home economy is positively correlated with income in the host economy, the
resulting flow of remittances could also become procyclical. The existing empiri-
cal literature is inconclusive about the cyclical nature of remittances. While some
prominent contributions highlight the countercyclical nature of remittances, and
hence stress the income smoothing effect of remittance inflows, other papers suggest
that remittances are procyclical.
1Migration and Development Brief is a publication of the World Bank which reports on global
trends in migration and remittance flows, major policy developments, Sustainable Development
Goal (SDG) indicators for reducing remittance costs and recruitment costs.
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In this paper, we offer an explanation to the inconclusive findings from large cross-
country datasets. Our explanation rests on the importance of South-South remit-
tances as opposed to North-South remittances. From the migration literature we
know that South-South migration is an important part of global migration. Ta-
ble (1) provides information of the global stock of migrants and a breakdown into
South-North and South-South migration. In 2015, the year for which we obtain
latest available data, 40% of the migrants from low income countries indeed reside
in other low income countries. The current stock of migrants from low income home
countries residing in low income host countries amounts to 68 million persons. The
remaining 60% of migrants moved to high income countries. Only 9% of migrants
from high income countries live in low income countries. Hence, South-South mi-
gration is quantitatively a very important phenomenon.
Migrants from low income economies that now live in other low income economies
might lack the resources to remit funds to their home economy. In the aggregate,
a large share of remittances from other low income countries should lead to overall
remittance inflows which, due to their lack of correlation with domestic income, are
neither countercyclical nor procyclical, but acyclical. The existing literature typi-
cally controls for income in the host economy, but does not look at the share of re-
mittance inflows to low income countries originating in other low income economies.
This variable is our key to understand the cyclicality puzzle of remittances.
We explore the cyclical nature of remittances using a dataset with annual frequency
composed of 101 countries that spans the period 2001 to 2015. We document the
inconclusive cyclicality of remittance inflows for this large dataset. Our central
contribution is an attempt to explain this pattern of the data. We distinguish
between North-South flows and South-South flows. For each receiving country, we
calculate the share of remittances stemming from other low income countries. We
include this variable as an additional explanatory variable in a regression which
aims at explaining the cyclicality of remittances. We find that for a higher share of
flows from low income countries the cyclicality of remittances disappears. Hence,
the empirical puzzle mentioned before can be solved once South-South remittance
flows are taken into account.
Although a few prior studies explore the subject of South-South flows, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive study on the cyclical impact of South-
South remittance flows. Ratha and Shaw (2007) investigate bilateral migration
data and detail out some working hypotheses on the determinants and socioeco-
nomic implications of South-South migration as well as South-South remittance
flows. However, they do not mention the cyclicality impact of South-South flows.
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One caveat remains the fact that the share of remittances from low income countries
might itself be affected by the cyclical nature of remittances. Suppose remittances
fail to smooth income shocks in migrants’ home economies. After an extremely large
income shock, this failure might trigger cross-border migration. Hence, the share
of inflows could incorporate some endogenous feedback from previous remittance
inflows. In this paper, we address this concern through an instrumental variables
(IV) approach. We instrument the share of flows from low income countries by a
dummy that reflects the colonial history of a remittances-receiving country. The
existence of a colonial motherland is a good predictor for a large share of remittance
inflows originating in high income economies. The IV regression supports our main
argument.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two surveys the existing literature on the
cyclical nature of remittances. Section three explains the data and the estimated
model. The main results are discussed in section four. Section five offers results
from an instrumental variables estimation and section six concludes.
2 Related literature
From the vast amount of literature available on remittances, we focus on the branch
of the literature which revolves around the cyclicality of remittances with respect to
domestic macroeconomic variables. Up to now, the evidence regarding the cyclical
properties of remittance inflows is mixed.
One of the key contributions is Frankel (2011). The author provides evidence of
the countercyclical nature of remittances by expounding the smoothing hypothesis,
whereby remittances are countercyclical with respect to income in the worker’s coun-
try of origin and, as a flip side, procyclical with respect to income in the migrant’s
host country. According to Frankel’s econometric results, remittances constitute
a preeminently valuable component of aggregate capital inflows in domestic down-
turns or when international investors flee the country. Likewise, Buch and Kuckulenz
(2010) support the notion of countercyclical nature of remittance inflows. They bring
this into effect by focusing on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and
on differences in these determinants between remittances and other capital flows.
Bugamelli and Paterno (2009) evaluate whether workers’ remittances reduce the
probability of current account reversals. Their results suggest that remittances
indeed strengthen financial stability by reducing the likelihood of large current ac-
count adjustments. Their findings further point to the fact that large, cheap and
stable flows of workers’ remittances from a large panel of emerging and develop-
4
ing economies exhibit these features. These authors investigate a cross section of
about 60 emerging and developing countries over the period 1980-2003 and find
that the volatility dampening effect is larger in low income countries where invest-
ment opportunities are limited and consumption needs are strong. In the same vein,
Machasio (2016) evaluates the role of remittance flows to developing countries in
the aftermath of sovereign defaults and finds evidence that remittances are resilient
and consequently facilitate an economic stabilization of recipient economies after
a a default. Additionally, to support the hypothesis that remittances are coun-
tercyclical, Combes and Ebeke (2011) analyze the relationship between migrants’
remittances and consumption instability. Their econometric results suggest that
remittance-receiving countries exhibit on average lower consumption instability.
De et al. (2016) examine the behavior of remittances over the business cycle and
their potential to act as a stabilizer during periods of high business cycle volatility.
Their findings reveal that remittances are relatively stable and countercyclical, thus
ultimately implying that remittances have the potential to make a critical contribu-
tion in smoothing consumption in the face of economic adversity.
While these authors strengthen the case of remittances being countercyclical, others
find more mixed results. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) use a data set of bilateral
remittance flows to evaluate the determinants of workers’ remittances. They find
mixed motives associated with remittances. According to their findings, altruism
seems not to be the prime motive because as depicted by their results, remittances
do not increase in the aftermath of natural disasters. As a consequence of being
procyclical, they dwindle when exports weaken and GDP growth slows. They also
falter when the investment climate worsens and do not seem to respond to adverse
shocks at home.
Supporting mixed evidence, Sayan (2006) studies 12 developing and emerging coun-
tries and does not find general countercyclicality of remittance flows. Model-based
evidence provided by Durdu and Sayan (2010) is also inconclusive as the relative size
of opposite effects on the cyclical nature of remittances is unclear. For remittance
flows to Mexico and Turkey, they find opposite cyclical characteristics. Remittances
dampen business cycles in Mexico whereas they do indeed amplify cycles in Turkey.
Mughal and Ahmed (2014) examine the business cycle properties of remittances to
four South Asian economies which are considered principal economies within the
region. Remittances to India and Pakistan are mostly acyclical with respect to host
region business cycles and countercyclical with respect to home output. On the
other hand, the opposite is true for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as remittance flows
in these smaller economies are found to be mainly procyclical.
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Although the above mentioned papers have explored the relationship between remit-
tances and domestic macroeconomic variables, none of them has explicitly considered
this in the light of North-South and South-South flows. In this paper, we argue that
the role of South-South flows is a key to understand the variety of findings regarding
the cyclical properties of remittances.
3 Data
We take into account a large set of countries and distinguish North-South from
South-South remittance flows. The choice of countries in our sample and the cor-
responding sample period, which spans from 2001 to 2015, are dictated by data
availability. The selection of countries is reported in Table (2).
3.1 Construction of variables
To put forward our main point, we use data on the source countries of remittance
flows and a summary statistic for the cyclical nature of remittances. We first con-
struct a measure of the sources of remittance inflows. To construct this indicator,
which we refer to as share, we use bilateral remittance data availed by the World
Bank. A large matrix summarizes the bilateral volume of flows for each country
in a given year. Based on the matrix of bilateral flows in 2014, we aim at distin-
guishing South-South from North-South flows. To facilitate this process, we use the
World Bank classification to distinguish between high-income economies and low
and middle income countries, respectively. The variable share describes the share
of remittance inflows of each country that is received from low-income countries. If
a certain country receives more than half of its remittances from high income coun-
tries, then such flows are considered North-South remittance flows. The converse
holds if more than half of remittance flows are received from other low and middle
income countries thus giving rise to South-South flows. Table (2) also reports this
share for each country in the sample in 2014. While the flows of remittances and the
relative role of specific source countries vary over time, the share of flows from low
income countries is relatively stable, such that using the latest available flow matrix
from 2014 does not imply a large loss of information. The mean (median) country
obtains 34% (23%) of its remittance inflows from low income countries. Lesotho
is the country with the highest share of inflows from other low income economies
(99%), while Jamaica is the country which receives all of its remittance inflows from
high income countries.
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Our second measure describes the cyclical nature of remittance inflows. We de-
fine the cyclicality of remittance inflows by the unconditional correlation between
the annual percentage change in real GDP of the receiving country and the first
difference of annual remittance inflows relative to GDP. Hence, our measure is
corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REM
GDP
)
.2 The correlation is calculated over the period 2001 to
2015 with GDP data taken from the World Bank. Suppose relative to GDP, re-
mittances increase while the growth rate of real GDP is negative. In this case,
remittances are considered countercyclical. If remittances fall in a year in which
GDP also falls, remittances are procyclical.
The cross-country mean of this correlation is only 0.05 with a minimum of -0.67
and a maximum of 0.77. Hence, there is no clear pattern in the data as to whether
remittances inflows are procyclical or anticyclical. In fact, this evidence suggests
that on average remittances are acyclical. The aim of this paper is to explain the
missing cyclicality in remittance inflows. The correlations are described in Figure
(1), which presents a histogram of corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REM
GDP
)
. We see that the
data does not suggest a clear-cut characterization of remittances being procyclical
or countercyclical, respectively.
We now take a step back and note that the data behind the histogram in Figure (1)
represents a corner solution only. If we take into account the share of remittances
from low-income countries, both positive and negative correlations become much
smaller. To illustrate this point, we use a scatter plot, see Figure (2), which shows
our measure of cyclicality plotted against the share of inflows from other low-income
countries. The figure and the histogram presented before show the same property
of the data: both positive and negative correlation are almost equally likely.
The new dimension we add to this literature becomes apparent if we allow for
the share of remittance from low income countries to differ from zero. We find
that for a low share of inflows from low income countries, remittance inflows are
either procyclical or anticyclical. However, a striking finding emerges for countries
that receive a large share of their remittance inflows from low-income countries: in
this case the degree of procyclicality or countercyclicality vanishes completely and
remittance are acyclical. Thus, the higher the share of remittance inflows from low
income countries, the more the cyclicality of remittances vanishes.
This finding is highlighted by two regression lines included in Figure (2). Each line
reflects a simple OLS regression of the correlation on the share from low-income
countries. One is drawn for all countries that exhibit procyclical remittance in-
2Alternative measures of the cyclical part of GDP such as the linearly detrended logarithm of
real GDP lead to virtually identical results and are not reported here.
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flows and another regression line is plotted for countries’ countercyclical remittances.
While the slope of the former is negative, the slope of the latter is positive. Since
cyclicality disappears for each subgroup of countries, we cannot detect a global
connection between cyclicality and the share of South-South flows.
As regards the quality of the data, a caveat is warranted: the magnitude of re-
mittance flows is notoriously prone to measurement errors. While official statistics
provide a reasonable approximation to remittance inflows and outflows to and from
advanced and medium-income countries, the quality of the data sharply deterio-
rates for low-income countries. Since the key variable for our argument is the share
if inflows from low income countries, concerns about data quality should be kept
in mind. It is possible that we underestimate the share from low-income countries
since these transfers work though informal channels and are likely to be missed by
official statistics.
3.2 Regression equation
To study the connection between cyclicality and the source of remittance flows more
formally, we run an OLS regression of corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REM
GDP
)
on ŝhare and two
control variables. The control variables are the log of per-capita GDP and the log
of overall remittance inflows relative to GDP. The first control variable captures
the level of economic development, while the latter reflects the overall magnitude
of remittance inflows. In an alternative specification, we distinguish procyclical and
countercyclical remittance inflows and, thus, allow the coefficients to be different
according to the cyclicality of remittance inflows.
As share is bounded between zero and one, we use a logistic transformation and use
the resulting ŝhare as the explanatory variable in the regression
ŝhare ≡ log
(
share
1− share
)
.
Although in principle the correlation is also bounded between minus one and plus
one, we do not transform it in a way similar to share. This is because Figure (2)
shows that none of the observed correlations is actually close to one or minus one.
The cross-sectional regression is the following
corr
(
∆ log(GDP ),∆
REM
GDP
)
= α + βsĥare+ γX′ + ε,
where the vector X collects the control variables. The estimated coefficient on ŝhare,
β, is the one we are mostly interested in. In an extension to be discussed below,
8
we differentiate an estimated β coefficient for countries with a positive remittances-
growth correlation and countries with a negative correlation.
4 Results
Table (3) contains the results for the baseline model. The first two columns report
the estimates of the model in which we do not distinguish between positive and neg-
ative correlations. In both cases, the coefficient on ŝhare is statistically not different
from zero. Thus, there is no systematic relationship of the cyclicality of remittances
with the share from low-income countries. This is not surprising as a positive slope
coefficient in a linear regression would imply that a country with countercyclical re-
mittances would, for a growing share from low income countries, exhibit procyclical
inflows. Therefore, we now let the coefficient on ŝhare differ between countries with
a positive correlation and countries with a negative, see columns III and IV. We ob-
tain coefficient estimates which are significantly different from zero. The coefficient
on ŝhare for countries with procyclical remittances is -0.066. This implies that for a
larger fraction of inflows from low income countries, the degree of procyclicality falls
and eventually disappears. For countries with countercyclical inflows, the coefficient
on ŝhare is 0.071. If the share from low-income countries increases, the correlation
will decrease such that countercyclicality eventually disappears.
In Table (4), we allow the coefficient on the measure of cyclicality to be different
across regions. For countries with procyclical inflows, we find that for all regions
the procyclicality disappears with larger inflows from low income countries. The
coefficient is significantly negative for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
respectively. Interestingly, the absolute value of the coefficient is larger in Asia
and Latin America than in Africa. For countries with countercyclical inflows, the
estimated coefficient is significantly positive if the country is located in Asia and
Latin America. For Africa, however, the estimated coefficient is not significant.
5 Instrumental variables estimation
In the previous section, the explanatory variable, ŝhare, has been taken as given. It
could be argued, however, that the share from low-income countries is not completely
exogenous. This is based on the idea that the share of remittances from low-income
countries might itself be depending on the properties of aggregate remittance inflows
and their interaction with GDP growth. Suppose a low income country receives
remittance inflows which are procyclical. Thus, a depression or a fall in income due
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to a natural disaster is made worse through a drop in remittance inflows. This could
trigger cross-border migration to neighboring countries, which are most likely also
low-income countries. Countercyclical inflows might stabilize the home economy
and could lead to the return of migrants. Hence, the share of remittance flows from
low-income countries might at least partly be endogenous.
We now want to address this issue by estimating a Two-Stage Least Squares re-
gression. The aim is to use an appropriate instrument for ŝhare. The instrument
should be correlated with the share of flows from low-income countries and exoge-
nous with regard to the correlation of remittances inflows with GDP growth. To
find an instrument, we exploit the fact that many developing countries have been
colonies of high income European economies. The underlying idea is that a country
which has been a colony of, say, France, is more likely to receive a large share of
remittances from France or other high income economies. A country without ties
to former colonial motherlands, in contrast, is more likely to receive a large share of
remittance inflows from other low-income countries.
Our instrument is a dummy variable that is one if a country has been a colony
of a European economy after the second world war and zero otherwise. Since the
dummy variable reflects colonial history, it is, by definition, exogenous with regard to
contemporaneous remittance flows. The first-stage regression relates the share from
low-income countries to a constant and the instrumental dummy. The coefficient
in the first stage-regression is -0.107, which is significant at the 5% level. Hence,
being a former colony implies a significantly smaller share of remittance inflows from
low income countries. Countries which have been a colony on average have a one
percentage point lower share of remittance inflows from low income countries. Since
we need to estimate two parameters on ŝhare, one for positive and one for negative
correlations, we construct the instrument separately for countries with procyclical
remittances and for countries with countercyclical remittances.
The results of the two-state least squares regression is shown in Table (5). While
ŝhare is not statistically significant for countries with procyclical remittance inflows,
it is significant for countries with countercyclical inflows. The estimated coefficient is
0.21, such that countries with countercyclical remittance inflows exhibit less coun-
tercyclicality if the share of remittances from low income countries increases. In
sum, the results support the evidence from least squares obtained before.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies the cyclical nature of remittance flows to developing countries
and introduces a new perspective on why researchers failed to establish a consensus
about whether remittances are procyclical or countercyclical. We show that the
share of remittances originating in other low-income countries plays a major role
in explaining cyclicality: the larger the share of flows from low-income countries,
the less remittances exhibit a systematic relationship with income in the receiving
country. Since migrants to other low income countries typically lack the resources
to respond to income shocks in their home economies, their presence reduces overall
cyclicality.
These findings have important policy implications, mostly because some of the fa-
vorable properties assigned to remittance inflows indeed depend on whether they
are countercyclical. Remittances cannot serve as an insurance mechanism against
income drops, stemming, among other factors, from natural disasters, financial cri-
sis or political turmoil, when most inflows come from other low income countries.
Therefore, when judging the potential of remittance inflows as a source of income
and consumption smoothing, respectively, researchers and policymakers have to ac-
count for the source countries of remittances.
It is widely accepted that countercyclical remittance flows to developing countries
could considerably contribute towards stabilization policies in economic downturns.
To attain the aforementioned objectives, developing countries should adopt poli-
cies that are likely to strengthen remittance flows and enhance their consump-
tion smoothing benefits. In this regard, focusing on reducing remittance costs and
strengthening the financial infrastructure that supports remittances would be key
policy issues. This would enable South-South migrants to channel funds to their
home country. The benefits associated with remittance cost reduction policy in-
tervention is threefold: first, it will create a channel through which resources can
be transferred by low income migrants to their families back home. Second, it
will increase flows through formal financial services, especially banks. Third, it
will improve financial access for the low income in developing and emerging market
countries.
In contrast to fees on large cross-border transfers, the remittance costs of small,
personal transfers are high. This constitutes a severe constraint on both the sending
migrant and the receiving home economy. Reducing transaction fees will therefore
increase disposable income of low income migrants and increase incentives to remit
as well as increase annual remittance flows to developing countries. This will even-
tually also contribute to strengthening the role of remittances as a countercyclical
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stabilization tool.
It is important to implement policies that build on alternative remittance channels.
These would be an alternative to mainstream banks and money transfer agencies.
For instance, remitting funds using mobile phones has gained popularity worldwide
because mobile payments provide a quick, cheap and accessible option, and is con-
sidered particularly important for remote areas.
A second implication pertains to domestic economic policies in the receiving coun-
tries. Policies that encourage countercyclical remittance inflows should be designed
in order to benefit from remittance inflows. One way to achieve this would be to
adopt countercyclical macroprudential policies directed towards capital inflow such
as countercyclical reserve requirements.
Multinational institutions and development initiatives promote remittances as a
vehicle for economic stability and growth. It should be recognized that not all
remittances are created equal - it is typically only the fraction of remittance inflows
from high income countries that contributes to economic stabilization.
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Table 1: Migrant stocks
migrants in
migrants from low income countries high income countries total
low income countries 68 mio. (40%) 102 mio. (60%) 170 mio. (100%)
high income countries 9 mio. (22%) 33 mio. (78%) 43 mio. (100%)
total 77 mio. (36%) 136 mio. (64%) 214 mio. (100%)
Notes: The data comes from the United Nations’ ”Trends in International Migrant Stock” 2015
database (table 16).
Figure 1: Cross-country distribution of correlation between GDP growth and
remittance inflows
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Figure 2: Correlation of GDP with remittance inflows as a function of the share
of remittances from low-income countries
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and ŝhare. Countries in blue (triangles)
exhibit countercyclical remittance inflows. Countries in red (dots) exhibit procyclical remit-
tance inflows. We also plot one regression line for countries with corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REMGDP
)
>
0 and one for corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REMGDP
)
< 0
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Table 2: Sample countries
country share country share country share
Lesotho 0.99 Chile 0.43 Sri Lanka 0.09
Burkina Faso 0.96 Colombia 0.43 Philippines 0.08
Swaziland 0.96 Nicaragua 0.42 China 0.08
Namibia 0.96 Sao Tome-Principe 0.40 Belize 0.07
Azerbaijan 0.93 Mongolia 0.39 Mauritius 0.07
Botswana 0.93 Guinea-Bissau 0.36 Turkey 0.06
Paraguay 0.86 Ghana 0.34 Guatemala 0.06
Kyrgyz Republic 0.85 Djibouti 0.34 Honduras 0.06
Rwanda 0.84 Bangladesh 0.33 Ecuador 0.05
Malawi 0.80 Senegal 0.32 Vietnam 0.05
Mozambique 0.79 Maldives 0.32 Vanuatu 0.05
Georgia 0.79 Cameroon 0.31 Guyana 0.04
Mali 0.78 Croatia 0.31 Madagascar 0.04
West Bank and Gaza 0.78 Nigeria 0.31 Albania 0.04
Cote d’Ivoire 0.77 Sudan 0.30 Iran 0.04
Kazakhstan 0.76 Indonesia 0.29 St. Lucia 0.03
Togo 0.76 Peru 0.23 El Salvador 0.03
Armenia 0.75 Macedonia, FYR 0.23 St. Vincent-Gr. 0.03
Russian Federation 0.74 Haiti 0.23 Dominican Rep. 0.03
Belarus 0.73 Costa Rica 0.21 Barbados 0.03
Lao PDR 0.73 Argentina 0.19 Tonga 0.03
Ukraine 0.66 Nepal 0.18 Suriname 0.03
Myanmar 0.65 Kenya 0.18 Yemen 0.02
Cambodia 0.62 Brazil 0.17 Algeria 0.02
Moldova 0.59 Thailand 0.17 Romania 0.02
Guinea 0.58 Malaysia 0.15 St. Kitts-Nevis 0.02
Bolivia 0.57 Korea 0.13 Dominica 0.02
Sierra Leone 0.56 Jordan 0.13 Tunisia 0.01
Congo, DR 0.55 South Africa 0.12 Fiji 0.01
Bulgaria 0.51 Egypt 0.12 Malta 0.01
Uganda 0.50 Panama 0.11 Morocco 0.01
Uruguay 0.47 Cabo Verde 0.10 Mexico 0.00
Tanzania 0.47 Solomon Isl. 0.09 Jamaica 0.00
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.46 Ethiopia 0.09
Notes: Share refers to the share of overall remittance inflows from low-income countries in the year
2014. The construction of the variable is explained in the text.
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Table 3: Baseline results
I II III IV
dependent variable: corr
(
∆GDP,∆REM
GDP
)
constant 0.051
(0.033)
−0.056
(0.278)
0.048
(0.039)
−0.281
(0.218)
ŝhare −0.002
(0.017)
0.001
(0.017)
ŝhare× corr pos −0.066
(0.018∗∗∗)
−0.058
(0.019∗∗∗)
ŝhare× corr neg 0.071
(0.025∗∗∗)
0.086
(0.029∗∗∗)
log(pcGDP ) 0.015
(0.033)
0.050
(0.029∗)
log
(
REM
GDP
)
0.002
(0.023)
0.013
(0.021)
# obs. 102 102 102 102
R2 0.000 0.002 0.252 0.27
adj. R2 -0.010 -0.028 0.237 0.24
Notes: Estimated by OLS. A significance level of 10%, 5% or 1% is indicated by *,** and ***,
respectively.
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Table 4: Baseline results with regional interaction terms
I II
dependent variable: corr
(
∆GDP,∆REM
GDP
)
constant 0.209
(0.074∗∗∗)
0.277
(0.287)
ŝhare× corr pos
×DAfrica −0.051
(0.022∗∗)
−0.054
(0.024∗∗)
×DAsia −0.122
(0.048∗∗)
−0.128
(0.049∗∗)
×DLatAm −0.129
(0.041∗∗∗)
−0.134
(0.042∗∗∗)
ŝhare× corr neg
×DAfrica 0.017
(0.037)
0.014
(0.034)
×DAsia 0.122
(0.039∗∗∗)
0.115
(0.039∗∗∗)
×DLatAm 0.079
(0.033∗∗)
0.073
(0.035∗∗)
log(pcGDP ) −0.012
(0.032)
log
(
REM
GDP
) −0.011
(0.016)
regional dummies yes yes
# obs. 102 102
R2 0.422 0.424
adj. R2 0.366 0.353
Notes: Estimated by OLS. A significance level of 10%, 5% or 1% is indicated by *,** and ***,
respectively.
19
Table 5: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
dependent variable
corr
(
∆log(GDP ),∆REM
GDP
)
constant 0.075
(0.125)
ŝhare× corr pos −0.131
(0.115)
ŝhare× corr neg 0.206∗∗
(0.103)
# obs. 102
R2 -0.326
adj. R2 -0.342
Notes: Estimated by TSLS. The instrument is a dummy variable which is one if the country was a
colony of a European economy after the second world war and zero otherwise. A significance level
of 10%, 5% or 1% is indicated by *,** and ***, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Do Remittance Flows Promote Financial Inclusion?
Do Remittance Flows Promote Financial Inclusion?
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Abstract
This paper evaluates whether remittances promote financial inclusion in
developing countries. We construct an index of financial inclusion and present
single equation estimates of the effects of remittances on financial inclusion.
The paper uses data on remittance flows to 61 developing countries from dif-
ferent regions around the world spanning from 2000-2014. The study uses
fixed effects as well as GMM IV estimations. The regression results confirm
the hypothesis that remittances increase financial inclusion through their ef-
fect on financial sector development. This can be intuitively explained by the
fact that sending and receiving remittances increase senders and recipients use
of financial services. The study shows that a one percentage point increase in
remittances causes financial inclusion to increase by about 2.49% per capita.
Remittances can therefore be considered a catalyst of financial inclusion in
development.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide remittances have been on a growing trend and remain highly significant
for most developing and emerging economies. Although remittances declined by
1% and 2.4% in 2015 and 2016 respectively, remittances to developing countries
rebounded by about 8.5% to reach a record high of $466 billion in 2017. According
to World Bank estimates, i.e. Migration and Development Brief 2018, remittances
to developing countries are expected to continue to increase in 2018 by 4.1% to reach
$485 billion. Most authors argue that remittances are inherently pro-poor owing to
the fact that they are direct in nature and are much better targeted to the needs
of the poor than Foreign Direct Investments and Official Development Assistance.
Remittances go directly to their intended recipients without necessarily undergoing
bureaucratic processes. As a result, these remittances provide an additional source of
income to the recipients without creating administration related problems associated
with Official Development Assistance as cited by Ratha and Mahopatra (2007).
At the macro level remittances may stabilize the capital account of the recipient
countries because they do not create future liabilities and, as opposed to other
capital flows, they are more stable or even countercyclical, as depicted by Fritz
et al. (2008). The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether remittances promote
financial inclusion in developing countries.
Financial inclusion is an important emerging topic and a salient driver of economic
development. According to the Bank of International Settlements, financial inclu-
sion is the process of ensuring access to appropriate financial products and services
needed by all members of the society in general and vulnerable groups in particular,
at an affordable cost and in a fair and transparent manner by mainstream institu-
tional players. Some researchers have cited financial inclusion as the panacea for
combating poverty and most importantly the impetus for growth and development
with respect to developing countries. According to Sarma and Pais (2011), financial
inclusion is the ease of access, availability and usage of the formal financial system by
all members of the economy. Lower levels of financial inclusion have been associated
with higher crime incidence, general decline of investments, difficulties in obtaining
credit and increased levels of unemployment among many other dire consequences.
Researchers and practitioners working on issues of international development and
poverty reduction take into consideration financial inclusion as a high-ranking agenda.
For example, the United Nation’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) cite
financial inclusion as a fundamental underpinning of wider progress, with 5 of the
17 SDG’s specifically mentioning the need for improved or universal access to finan-
cial services. The Financial Inclusion 2020 initiative, which brings together major
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donors, e.g. the UN and World Bank, as well as many private stakeholders, such as
Citibank and Visa, convene to discuss initiatives regarding achieving financial inclu-
sion by the year 2020. The AFI (Alliance for Financial Inclusion) was constituted
in 2008 and includes members from more than 90 countries working together to
advance the adoption of proven and innovative financial inclusion policy solutions.
There are two main ways in which remittances could potentially affect financial in-
clusion. First, remittances might increase demand for savings instruments because
households might require to save the extra amount of remittances received. Second,
remittances potentially increase household’s likelihood of obtaining a loan because
remittance records can potentially be used as a form of security for borrowing from
the banks. According to Anzoategui et al. (2014), remittances increases the likeli-
hood of having an account by at least 11%.
There are a couple of benefits associated with an inclusive financial system. Firstly,
the facilitation of efficient allocation of productive resources can possibly diminish
cost of capital and secondly, access to related financial services can notably cause
an improvement in the day to day financial management. This therefore means that
households can eventually eradicate poverty by working themselves and their fami-
lies out of poverty. Thirdly, an inclusive financial system can help curtail the growth
of informal sources of credit, e.g. exploitative money lenders. The aforementioned
benefits are just but a few among the numerous merits of financial inclusion. Al-
together, an inclusive financial system improves efficiency and welfare by providing
channels for secure saving practices and by facilitating enhanced financial services.
Kempson et al. (2004) evaluate the nexus between the level of financial inclusion
and income inequality. The results depict that countries with low levels of income
inequality tend to have lower levels of financial exclusion, while the highest levels of
exclusion are found in the least equal ones. It is also evident that small countries
with a large emigrant worker population may have higher levels of financial inclusion
if emigrant workers utilize the banking system for receiving remittances. According
to Toxopeus and Lensink (2008), remittances are likely to stimulate development
without increasing debt or administrative burden. This implies that they are likely
to improve financial inclusion by virtue of providing affordable financial services
within the formal system to those who tend to be excluded.
We construct our own index of financial inclusion (IFI) following Sarma (2008) to
investigate macro level factors that can be associated with financial inclusion. We
construct a new index because of two main reasons: firstly, previous indices omit
some variables which we consider important. For example, Toxopeus and Lensink
(2008) construct a predicted share of households with bank accounts to depict fi-
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nancial inclusion. They regress the share of households with bank accounts on the
log of deposit accounts per 100,000 people and log of average deposit account size in
US Dollars. Much as their measure of financial inclusion takes into account banking
penetration and usage dimensions, it is quite evident that the access dimension was
omitted. The new index that we construct in this paper is therefore a broader in-
dex owing to the fact that it consists of wider range of dimensions by incorporating
banking penetration, access and usage proxies. Secondly, our sample period spans
a wider time frame, covering 61 economies from 2000-2014. We take into account
a wider time horizon in comparison to Sarma’s, whose sample period only spans
2004-2010.
A measure that aggregates several dimensions into a single multidimensional index
aids in summarizing the complex nature of financial inclusion and helps to monitor
its evolution. We develop a three dimension index based on various proxies which are
then aggregated into a composite index. The three dimensions constitute banking
penetration, access and usage. Banking penetration refers to the proportion of
account holders in a certain population. Accessibility lays emphasis on geographic
and demographic penetration indicators. This is key because physical distance to
points of service tends to be a form of barrier to financial inclusion. Typically, in an
inclusive financial system, banking services should be easily available and accessible
to the users. The most prominent indicators of accessibility are banking outlets
such as personnel, branches and offices. In this case, we take into account number
of bank branches and number of ATMs (Automated Teller Machines) to measure
access. Usage dimension entails savings and deposits patterns by use of credit and
deposit proxies.
We acknowledge that a good index of financial inclusion could facilitate the process
of setting national financial inclusion targets as well as monitor progress in attaining
them. This is in essence effected because policy makers would be in a position to
diagnose the state of financial inclusion, set targets, identify barriers, craft policies
and ultimately monitor and measure policy impact. The index of financial inclusion
incorporates information on these dimensions in one single number lying between
0 and 1, where zero denotes complete financial exclusion and 1 complete financial
inclusion. We construct a new index taking into consideration the minimum and
maximum values across countries therefore provides a good measure of comparison.
To estimate the effects of remittances on financial inclusion, this paper uses Fixed
Effects Estimation as well as GMM Dynamic Panel Instrumental Variables Esti-
mation to address endogeneity concerns. Reverse causality could be a problem
because, firstly, financial inclusion might reduce the costs of sending and receiving
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remittances hence is likely to make migrants more prone to send and households to
receive remittances. Secondly, financial institutions could finance migration, and,
consequently increase the remittance flow toward households with access to credit.
One limitation of the study is the fact that, to some extent, digital cash variables
are not fully captured because we include mobile subscription and internet users
to incorporate mobile banking and technology respectively. Adoption of branchless
banking or mobile money can increase financial access for unbanked segments by
reducing costs and eliminating distance travelled to access financial services.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a critical
review of the related literature regarding financial inclusion and remittances. Sec-
tion 3 describes the process of constructing an index of financial inclusion. Section
4 presents the econometric methodology and data sources. The same section also
provides a thorough descriptive analysis of remittances and financial inclusion. Sec-
tion 5 introduces our empirical specifications while section 6 investigates the link
between remittances and financial inclusion as well as the robustness of our findings.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Over the past decades, there has been a drastic surge in international remittances,
giving rise to a plethora of studies which focus on remittance flows. Of prime
importance to our study is research that examines the nexus between remittances
and financial inclusion. According to the literature that links financial inclusion to
remittance flows, most researchers focus on household survey data, implying that
their research mainly focuses on a microeconomic perspective.
There have been different approaches to coming up with a proxy for financial in-
clusion. Although there are guidelines on financial inclusion as depicted by various
financial inclusion indicators availed by the World Bank, literature on the same is
inconclusive. The Global Findex database is a recent initiative by the World Bank
as depicted by Demirgu¨c-Kunt et al. (2015). It provides interesting indicators of
financial inclusion from a micro perspective based on primary country-wide surveys
but unfortunately the various variables of interest only cover 2011, 2014 and 2017.
This brief time span complicates panel studies since it is not enough to come up
with conclusive studies. Moreover, pertinent variables like mobile money accounts
are only availed in the 2014 and 2017 database, yet, it is widely known that mobile
money has played a paramount role in financial inclusion at least in the context
of most developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Country-wide surveys involve
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substantial cost in addition to being time-consuming thus making it difficult to be
conducted on regular intervals.
A number of authors have attempted to construct a financial inclusion indicator.
Honohan (2008) constructs estimates of the fraction of households who have ac-
cess to formal financial intermediaries and afterwards does a comparison of these
estimates to poverty and inequality using the Gini coefficient. The estimates are
constructed by utilizing the ratio of micro finance accounts and bank accounts to
total population, household survey based access and the average deposit size and
GDP per capita for more than 160 countries. The main setback is that the estimates
provide only a one-time measure of financial inclusion. This therefore proves to be
inefficient in explaining changes over time and across countries.
Sarma (2008) takes into consideration three dimensions to measure financial inclu-
sion: Depth (banking penetration) using a proxy measure of the number of bank
accounts per 1000 population; Availability to measure proximity of access using the
number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 1000 population; and Usage to
measure the extent and frequency of use of the banking facilities by the customers.
Due to data limitation, she takes into account credit to GDP ratio.
Prior research has focused on the role of remittances on financial inclusion in light
of development. Toxopeus and Lensink (2008) posit that remittances can acceler-
ate development without increasing debt or the adminstrative burden. Remittances
are also presumed to improve financial inclusion by providing affordable financial
services within the formal financial system to those who tend to be excluded. In
their study, they use the predicted share of households with bank accounts to de-
pict financial inclusion. Remittances may therefore be presumed to play a crucial
role within the wider spectrum of access to finance. In explaining demand factors,
Toxopeus and Lensink (2008) attest to the fact that remittance senders need finan-
cial services that offer international payments option. The demand can create the
need for banking services or other financial services offered by financial institutions.
On the other hand, remittances channelled through bank accounts may encourage
savings and enable a better match for savings and investments in the economy. In
conclusion, Toxopeus and Lensink (2008) find that remittances potentially have a
development impact through the effect on financial inclusion. They demonstrate
this by use of single-equation estimates on remittances and financial inclusion. This
is effected by carrying out system estimates in which economic growth is explained
by financial inclusion and financial inclusion by remittances.
Anzoategui et al. (2014) evaluate remittances and financial inclusion and provide
evidence from El Salvador. They use data from the National Rural Household Sur-
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vey to investigate whether remittances affect household use of savings and credit
instruments from formal institutions. They use three disparate alternative depen-
dent dummy variables:
1) Whether the household has a deposit account at a formal financial institution.
2) Whether the household has applied for a loan at a formal financial institution.
3) Whether the household has received a loan from a formal financial institution.
Their findings reveal that although remittances have a positive impact on financial
inclusion by promoting the utilization of deposit accounts, they are not robust nor
do they have a significant effect on the demand for or use of credit from formal
institutions. According to Anzoategui et al. (2014), by virtue of relaxing credit
constraints, remittances might dwindle the need for external financing from financial
institutions , while at the same time bolstering the demand for savings instruments
at least in the context of El Salvador.
Another strand of literature closely related to our research is on the relationship
between remittances and financial development. Burges and Pande (2005) show
that, by allowing remittance-recipient households to accumulate savings and obtain
loans for productive long-term investments, the banking sector in particular can
have very significant impact on the level of poverty and growth. It is evident from
their study that lack of access to finance is one among the key reasons why people
from low-income background remain in a state of poverty.
Orozco and Fedewa (2006) provide evidence to support the fact that remittances
increase bancarization of remittance recipients, albeit at low levels. This is essen-
tially because banks create a form of transmitting mechanism through the financial
system, remittances enables remittance recipients to obtain other financial products.
Consequently, remittances ought to increase domestic credit if banks extend credits
to remittance recipients owing to the fact that these flows are perceived to be not
only large but also stable.
Aggarwal et al. (2011) empirically explore the impact of remittances on financial
system development and provide evidence that remittances promote financial devel-
opment by increasing the aggregate level of deposits and credits. They investigate
the nexus between remittances and financial development by laying focus on the
ratio of bank deposits and credit to GDP, taking into account 109 countries span-
ning across 1975-2007. The results obtained are robust to using different estimation
methodologies taking into consideration endogeneity concerns emanating from omit-
ted variables, measurement error and reverse causation. The overarching conclusion
is that remittances are positively associated with bank deposits and credit.
Using a panel of approximately 100 countries, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) em-
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pirically investigate how financial development influences the impact of remittances
on economic growth. Their study is based on the notion that remittances can be
a substitute of financial development by providing an alternative way to finance
investments and help to overcome credit constraints. The results obtained confirm
that remittances enhance growth to a higher extent in countries which have less
developed financial systems.
Fromentin (2017) analyzes the dynamic impact of remittances on financial devel-
opment for emerging and developing countries using a Pooled Mean Group (PMG)
approach. The results depict a positive long-run relationship between remittances
and financial development and a significant and slightly positive short-run relation-
ship, with the exception of low-income countries.
All the aforementioned strands of literature point out to the fact that there is an
existing link between remittances and financial inclusion; a concept which we further
investigate in this research paper.
3 Index of Financial Inclusion (IFI)
This section outlines sources and methods used to construct a multidimensional in-
dex of financial inclusion. We base our empirical analysis on a panel of 61 developing
countries with annual data from 2000 to 2014. Country coverage is dictated by data
availability on main variables of interest, in particular remittances and financial in-
clusion indicators. We embark on computing our own index of financial inclusion
precisely because past studies have omitted one or the other dimensions impacting
financial inclusion for various reasons. For instance, in evaluating the relationship
between remittances and financial inclusion with respect to El Salvadorian house-
holds, Anzoategui et al. (2014) use three alternative dependent dummy variables to
represent financial inclusion: (i) deposit accounts at formal financial institutions, (ii)
loan applications from financial institutions, and (iii) loans received from financial
institutions. In this case, they use each of these variables separately. This implies
that each time they use one of the three alternative measures, they omit a certain
important aspect of financial inclusion. On the other hand, Toxopeus and Lensink
(2008) use the predicted share of households with bank accounts as their measure
of financial inclusion in investigating the nexus between remittances and financial
inclusion in development. Sarma (2008) uses a dimension approach in calculating
an index of financial inclusion. However, consideration of credit as a share of GDP
as part of the usage dimension is somehow misleading. This is because credit as
a share of GDP depicts financial depth as opposed to the usage dimension of fi-
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nancial inclusion. Figure 3 shows comparison between the newly constructed index
and Sarma’s index and the data plots suggest that the former is upward biased. As
a matter of bridging the existing gap, we consider all dimensions associated with
financial inclusion to be critical, therefore, we incorporate three dimensions in order
to acquire a more holistic view of financial inclusion. Additionally, we comply with
some important mathematical properties associated with computation of a sound
index such as boundedness, unit-free property, homogeneity and monotonicity. Our
approach resembles Sarma (2008), whose methodology is similar to that used by the
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) for the construction of develop-
ment indices.
The figure below demonstrates the process of constructing our new index of financial
inclusion:
Figure 1: Index of Financial Inclusion (IFI) construction process
The index of financial inclusion takes into account three dimensions: access, usage
and banking penetration. This multidimensional approach is motivated by the no-
tion that the inclusiveness of a financial system ought to be evaluated along several
pertinent dimensions. Taking into account the multiple divergent dimensions used,
there are specific financial inclusion variables which constitute the respective dimen-
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sions. These variables provide useful information on the nature of inclusiveness of
a financial system. When these variables are used individually, they may provide
partial and incomplete information about the inclusiveness of the financial system.
As a result, the inferences could be misleading because one single variable does not
sufficiently capture the extent of financial inclusion.
Banking penetration dimension takes into consideration the number of bank ac-
counts within a certain region. Bank accounts are considered to be an important
measure of financial inclusion owing to the fact that in essence, all formal finan-
cial activities take place through accounts. The main reason for choosing account
ownership as one of the key constituent variables of dimension for financial inclu-
sion is that it provides an avenue for both payments and savings, which are likely
to be more closely related to household decisions than credit as depicted by Allen
et al. (2016). Accounts in this case provide a measure of banking penetration as
an important dimension of financial inclusion. An inclusive financial system should
have as many users as possible. We obtain data on account ownership from the
Financial Access Survey which is compiled and published by the IMF (International
Monetary Fund). The banking penetration dimension in this case takes into account
bank accounts with commercial banks per 1000 adults.
For the access and usage dimensions, we initially take into account two separate
variables during the dimension index computation process. After that, we calculate
the average of the two respective indices to arrive at the final combined dimension
indices. To illustrate this, take for instance access, a dimension which represents the
availability of financial services provided by banks to its customers. Banking services
should be easily accessible by the users in an inclusive financial system. In this study,
we measure access using two variables: ATMs (Automated Teller Machines) per
100000 people and commercial banks per 100000 people. ATMs are computerized
telecommunications devices that provide clients of a financial institution with access
to financial transactions in a public place. These ATMs are widely used and are
practical in the sense that they are easily accessible and operate even beyond banking
halls’ opening hours. Commercial bank branches are retail locations of resident
commercial banks and other resident banks that function as commercial banks.
They provide financial services to customers and are physically separated from the
main office but they are not organized as legally distinct subsidiaries. Considering
the move towards electronic banking and mobile banking, data on the availability
of these alternative forms of banking ought to be incorporated. However, we do not
include these other dimensions due to lack of consistent data on the same. We then
derive two indices using data on ATMs and commercial bank branches. The average
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of the two indices is then eventually considered as the combined index for the access
dimension.
Usage takes into consideration the actual activities that take place in the accounts.
Simply being in possession of a bank account is not enough for an inclusive system
because it is also imperative that the banking services are adequately utilized. We
consider two forms of utilization in this case: savings and loans. This is captured
using data on depositors per 1000 adults and borrowers per 1000 adults respectively.
Depositors with commercial banks are the reported number of deposit account hold-
ers at commercial banks and other resident banks functioning as commercial banks
that are resident nonfinancial corporations and households. For many countries,
data covers the total number of deposit accounts due to a lack of information on
account holders. The major types of deposits are checking accounts, savings ac-
counts, and time deposits. On the other hand, borrowers from commercial banks
are the reported number of resident customers that are nonfinancial corporations.
Likewise, households who obtained loans from commercial banks and other banks
functioning as commercial banks are also categorized as borrowers. For the majority
of countries, data covers the total number of loan accounts due to lack of informa-
tion on loan account holders. The usage dimension also consists of two variables,
namely depositors per 1000 adults and borrowers per 1000 adults. Both these usage
variables are derived from the World Development Indicators. Sarma (2008) uses
the ratio of domestic credit to GDP in depicting the usage dimension. This is where
we differ because in our opinion, this ratio is more likely to reflect financial depth as
opposed to usage because it provides a measure of the contribution of the financial
system to economic activities.
The construction of the index of financial inclusion entails three main steps as out-
lined below.
3.1 Step 1: Normalization of variables
The initial step entails consideration of all the five variables that constitute elements
of the final index of financial inclusion. Putting this into perspective, we initially
have five variables outlined as:
1. ATMs
2. Bank Branches
3. Deposits
4. Loans
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5. Accounts
We configure all these variables and report them as a share of 100,000 people. For
each of these five variables, we need to construct an index bound between 0 and 1.
We use each of the aforementioned variables to compute a dimension index as follows:
dji,t =
(
Aji,t−mj
M j−mj
)
where for country i,
j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is the number associated with a specific variable i.e. ATMs, Bank
Branches, Deposits, Loans and Accounts.
t is time.
Aji,t= Actual value of variable j.
mj= Lower limit for variable j , given by the observed minimum value, ∀i, ∀t.
M j= Upper limit for variable j , denoted by the maximum observed value, ∀i, ∀t.
The above computation ensures that dji,t lies between 0 and 1 where a higher value
of dji,t indicates a country’s higher achievement in dimension i. This implies that
a country which exhibits a maximum value of a certain variable at a certain time
will have a dimension index of 1. On the contrary, a country which exhibits the
minimum observed value will have a value of 0.
3.2 Step 2: Combination of dimension indices
This involves a combination of dimension indices with respect to variables that repre-
sent identical dimensions. This is because, looking at it from a broader perspective,
we need to merge various dimension indices which consist of respective variables
depicting the same dimension. For the access and usage dimensions, the subindex is
the arithmetic mean of the two constituent variables. Take for instance ATMs and
Bank Branches, these two variables and the corresponding dimension indices princi-
pally represent the access dimension. On the other hand, deposits and loans depict
the usage dimension. The last dimension, i.e. banking penetration is solely derived
from bank accounts which is the only variable that depicts banking penetration in
this study.
This process of merging the dimension indices to come up with a combined dimension
indices is shown below:
1. Access dimension is calculated as:
d1,i,t+d2,i,t
2
= d˜1,i,t
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2. Usage dimension is calculated as:
d3,i,t+d4,i,t
2
= d˜2,i,t
3. Banking penetration dimension undergoes no transformation but for nota-
tional consistency purposes, it is depicted as: d5,i,t=d˜3,i,t
We then end up with a combined dimension denoted as d˜1,i,t which represents access.
The same calculation applies to the usage dimension because it is composed of two
indices derived from ATMs and Bank branches variables. The resultant combined
usage dimension is denoted as d˜2,i,t. The banking penetration dimension consists
of only one variable therefore the resulting dimension index is incorporated into
the composite index without any form of modification. The banking penetration
dimension is denoted as d˜3,i,t.
3.3 Step 3: Computation of multi-dimensional index
The next step involves combining all the three dimensions. We work on the assump-
tion that equal weights are attached to the various dimensions in this specific case.
This therefore indicates equal importance of the respective constituent dimensions
in quantifying the inclusiveness of a financial system. After obtaining the respective
values of the combined dimension indices associated with access and usage as well
as banking penetration dimension for various years, the index of financial inclusion
(IFIi,t) is computed as follows:
IFIi,t =
1
2
[√
(d˜1,i,t)2 + (d˜2,i,t)2 + (d˜3,i,t)2√
3
+
(
1−
√
(1− d˜1,i,t)2 + (1− d˜2,i,t)2 + (1− d˜3,i,t)2√
3
)] (1)
The index of financial inclusion is the simple average of two distances: the first
being the normalized Euclidean distance of the various dimensions from the origin
of the cartesian plane and the second is the normalized inverse Euclidean distance
from the ideal point which is one in each of the three cases. Euclidean distance is
basically the distance between two points defined as the square root of the sum of
the squares of the differences between the corresponding coordinates of the points.
According to existing literature, Euclidean distance is the only metric that is the
same in all directions and as such referred to as rotation invariant. The literature
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has considered this to be not only the most convenient but also the most perceptible
way of representing distance between two points.
The resulting index of financial inclusion lies between 0 and 1 such that 0 denotes
financial exclusion while on the other hand, 1 indicates complete financial inclusion
with respect to the sample in this study. The newly constructed index of financial
inclusion is therefore a measure of inclusiveness of the financial sector of the various
countries in our sample. We consider it to be appropriate owing to the fact that
it is not only comparable across countries but it also takes into account various
important variables which impact financial inclusion.
In the subsequent regression equations, the dependent variable is a logit transfor-
mation of the newly constructed index of financial inclusion (IFIi,t). In this case,
unlike IFIi,t which lies between 0 and 1, the transformed variable lies between -∞
and∞. As a result, the transformed variable is a monotonically increasing function
of the IFIi,t and maintains the same ordering as IFIi,t. The transformed variable
appears as depicted below:
TIFI i,t = ln
(
IFIi,t
1− IFIi,t
)
Values of IFI and TIFI are displayed in section C of the Appendix.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
A couple of other variables are incorporated in evaluating the relationship between
financial inclusion and remittances. This is because these variables influence the
degree of financial inclusion in respective countries in our sample of study.
RemGDP refers to the ratio of remittances to GDP. Personal remittances comprise
personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers includes all
current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households from
nonresident households. Personal transfers therefore consists of all current transfers
between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to
the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in
an economy where they are considered nonresidents and of residents employed by
nonresident organizations. The working hypothesis in this paper is that remittances
contribute to financial inclusion in the sense that higher remittance inflows result
into higher degree of financial inclusion.
Apart from remittances, there are other control variables which are likely to influence
14
financial inclusion. Key among them is the income level of households which can be
measured by GDP per capita. Owing to the fact that a household’s income could
have a direct influence on financial inclusion, we include the natural logarithm of
GDP per capita because it controls for income effects that may influence access to
finance.
The literacy rate (Litrate) is the percentage of the population aged 15 years and
above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on
their everyday life. In general terms, literacy also encompasses numeracy i.e. the
ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by divid-
ing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group
population and multiplying the result by 100. Taking literacy rate into account
allows for the possibility that literate households are more likely to use financial
services compared to illiterate households. We therefore include the literacy rate
to represent financial literacy in our regressions. In this case, higher literacy rates
ought to be associated with higher levels of financial inclusion.
Domestic credit to private sector (Domcredit) refers to financial resources provided
to the private sector by financial corporate entities. This is effected through loans,
purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits as well as other accounts receiv-
ables, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include
credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities
and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporate organizations where
data is available. Higher domestic credit to private sector depicts higher levels of
financial inclusiveness.
Population encompasses total population which is based on the de facto definition
of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.
The population size plays a major role in measuring the inclusiveness of financial
services that are availed to the citizens of a certain country. In our regressions, we
take into account the natural logarithm of population (Logpop).
Mobile subscriptions refers to mobile cellular telephone subscriptions which are sub-
scriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to cellular technol-
ogy. The indicator includes the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number
of active prepaid accounts. The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions
that offer voice communications. This combined with internet users capture branch-
less banking within a certain country. In our regressions, we use the logarithmic
transformed version of mobile subscription (Logmbs). Internet users are individuals
who have used the Internet in the past 12 months. Although bank branches have
been captured as part of access dimension, it is widely observed that in the recent
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past most customers resort to internet banking which is deemed to be much more
convenient. Both these attributes are associated with an elevated degree of financial
inclusion. The variable representing internet users is Logint.
Control of corruption (Ctrlcorr) reflects perceptions of the extent to which public
power is not exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption. The higher the value of control of corruption, the better off the country
is because that implies that there are mechanisms in place to ensure that corruption
is eliminated. Corruption is a vice which tends to undermine financial inclusion
effects thus rendering citizens of a certain country to be excluded from mainstream
provision of financial services.
AgeDR is age dependency ratio which depicts the ratio of dependents. Dependents
constitute people younger than 15 years or older than 64 years expressed as a ratio to
the working-age population (ages 15-64). According to the prevailing data, AgeDR
is captured as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. The
lower the age dependency the higher the degree of financial inclusion and vice versa.
For the sake of incorporating business cycles, we ought to utilize 5 year averages.
However, owing to the fact that our sample period spans only a short period of time,
we settle on year on year GDP growth rate to capture business cycle effects. We
therefore include GDP growth as one of our control variables in order to capture
business cycle effects.
5 Econometric Framework
We formulate the following model to examine the relationship between remittances
and financial inclusion:
TIFIi,t = β0 + β1 (RemGDP)t−1 + β2X
′
i,t + εi,t,
where TIFIi,t is the transformed logistic function of the index of financial inclusion.
i refers to country and t refers to the year which in this study spans from 2000 to
2014. Since we are looking for a causal effect of remittances on financial inclusion,
we use a time lag in the analysis to address endogeneity issues. RemGDP refers to
annual remittances as a share of the Gross Domestic Product. The matrix X ′i,t is
a matrix of control variables that literature has found to affect financial inclusion
and β0 is the constant term. β1 is the coefficient of primary interest and the error
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term is denoted by εi,t. β2 on the other hand is a vector which includes coefficients
on the control variables.
Domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP is a measure meant to illustrate
that financial resources including loans and non equity securities are provided to
the private sector. This covers financial institutions like banks and other financial
corporations all measured as percentages with respect to GDP. The higher the ratio,
the higher financing is to private sector in a country consequently resulting in greater
opportunity and space for the private sector to develop and grow. Taking this into
consideration, bolstering the private sector and making it play a salient role in a
country’s economy is likely to contribute to overall development of a country. This
ratio is therefore deemed to be pertinent and a key factor with respect to financial
inclusion.
Population and GDP per capita are also considered to play a role in financial in-
clusion. This captures the divergent country demographics and facilitates the un-
derstanding of the role of population concentration on the penetration of banking
system. According to a report prepared by CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist
the Poor) in light of the 2012 Global Findex report, it is depicted that countries
with higher density and higher per capita income are associated with greater levels
of financial inclusion. This intuitively implies that a larger population should in-
crease financial access and as a result financial inclusion since this indicates a larger
market size.
We also take into account mobile subscription to capture the utilization of mobile
telephony for provision of financial services. This makes possible an offer of payment
and a range of financial services without a bank account as the mobile phone can
serve as a virtual bank card and store information related to customers and financial
institutions. Though not all mobile subscribers have a mobile money account, it is
widely accepted that mobile telephony reduces geographic constraints and trans-
action costs. By so doing, they increase the diffusion of a remote banking model
without incurring prohibitive distribution costs for massive distribution. This, cou-
pled with internet access take into account internet banking which is a recent trend
which does not require physical banking outlets. Mobile banking phenomena is most
widely embraced in Sub-Saharan Africa than any other region in the world.
We consider control of corruption as an important governance indicator because it
is expected that low levels of corruption ought to be associated with a high level
of financial inclusion and vice versa. Governments which have managed to reduce
corruption levels through various proactive initiatives such as forming transparency
agencies to enhance transparency and accountability have realized unprecedented
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levels of financial inclusion.
We took into consideration literacy rate as a proxy for financial literacy because
data on financial literacy was not available. The rationale behind settling on this
is that literate citizens are more likely to take initiative and make use of financial
services thus be financially included as opposed to the illiterate ones. Atkinson and
Messy (2013) define financial literacy as a combination of a host of attributes such
as awareness, knowledge, skill, attitude and behaviour necessary to come up with
sound financial decisions and ultimately achieve financial wellbeing. In order to
comprehend financial planning, a person should be financially literate and able to
understand the importance of preparing household budgets, cash-flow management
and asset allocation in order to meet financial goals. Generally, financial literacy is
one of the major challenges facing countries across the globe, irrespective of their
level of economic development and has been receiving significant attention from
policy makers worldwide. When literacy is taken into consideration, it is often
considered a hidden hurdle to bringing financial inclusion to the unbanked. Most
times, systems that should work in theory break down when poor people are unable
to learn how to use them or are unable to learn how to use them or are unable to
assume the accountability of consumers who know their rights and how to obtain
recourse to maintain transparency and honesty in the system.
Lower age dependency ratio would imply higher levels of financial inclusion and the
converse is true when we have a high age dependency ratio. Essentially, a lower
age dependency ratio implicitly means that majority of the country’s citizens are
in a position to fend for themselves and they do not necessarily depend on others
to access financial services. A high age dependency ratio on the other hand implies
that a larger segment of the population are either too young or above the retirement
age, which impedes their access to financial services as they do not earn income.
We follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in carrying
out GMM estimations. We use GMM instrumental variables approach in our esti-
mations because it is well suited to deal with endogeneity issues. It is common in
financial inclusion regression that some of the explanatory variables are endogenous.
This endogeneity may bias estimates of how the independent variables in equation
may affect the dependent variable in equation. The major sources of endogeneity are
likely to arise due to either unobservable heterogeneity or simultaenity. In normal
cirumstances, to eliminate unobservable heterogeneity, conventional fixed estima-
tions are used. However, this estimation assumptions hold only when we assume
that country characteristics or structures are strictly exogenous. i.e considered to
be purely random observations through time unrelated to country’s history. This is
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however a very strong assumption which is unlikely to be valid in reality. While OLS
estimation may be biased due to the fact that it ignores unobservable heterogeneity,
fixed effects may be biased owing to the fact that it neglects endogeneity. GMM is
considered a more efficient estimator in comparison to other estimators because it
can avoid the bias that ordinary least square suffers when an explanatory variable in
a regression is correlated with the regression’s disturbance term. Moreover, GMM
provides powerful instruments which account for simultaneity while eliminating any
unobservable heterogeneity.
In order to effect GMM IV regressions, we utilize OECD growth as our instrument.
The main reason as to why we settle on OECD growth is because we consider it to
be not only relevant but also valid. It is correlated with other endogenous variables
while at the same time orthogonal to the error process. We test the correlation
aspect by examining the fit of the first stage regressions. The validity of our model
is supported by a number of indicators:
Hansen J test (1982) of over-identifying restrictions tests validity of instruments.
According to our regression results, the variables are found to be orthorgonal to
the error process of financial inclusion on the basis of the Hansen J test results.
The implication therefore is that the choice of growth of OECD countries as an
instrument is considered valid for this research. The joint null hypothesis of the
Hansen test is that the instruments are exogenous. The foregoing statement implies
that they are not correlated with the error term and that the excluded instruments
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. This therefore means that the
choice of instrument is appropriate.
Additionally, the Arellano Bond test checks for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic
disturbance term in order to ascertain that the instruments are valid according
to Roodman (2009). In this case, there is sufficient evidence to suggest no serial
autocorrelation.
We applied the Windmeijer finite sample correction to standard errors in order to
evaluate the precision of the two-step estimators for hypothesis tests.
6 Empirical Evidence
6.1 Baseline Results
The estimation results from GMM IV model yield the expected sign on the coeffi-
cient of RemGDP thus supporting the hypothesis that remittances have a positive
and significant impact on financial inclusion. A country which receives remittances
amounting to 1% of GDP will enjoy an advantage of 2.49% improvement in financial
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inclusion. Improvement in financial inclusion is manifested through increment of the
respective variables which constitute the newly computed index of financial inclu-
sion. This implies that with respect to this research, countries used in the sample
exhibit increased number of ATMs, bank branches, deposits, loans as well as bank
accounts as the magnitude of remittances as a share of GDP increases.
<< insert table 2 here >>
According to Hansen J statistics, the P value 0.179 implies that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected. The inference here is that over-identifying restrictions are valid.
With regard to instrumentation, our estimations employ lags limitation thus confin-
ing the instrument count in such a way that instrument used are always less than
the number of panel groups.
Regarding Arellano-Bond test, our result is consistent as there is no second order au-
tocorrelation. The P-value of AR(2) is 0.352 which fails to reject the null hypothesis
of no second order autocorrelation.
6.2 Robustness Exercises
We carry out a number of robustness checks including: Fixed Effects estimations,
consideration of individual respective indicators and regional groups.
We use fixed effects estimations as an alternative to GMM estimations to illustrate
that our results hold. Fixed effects estimations take into consideration both country
and period fixed effects. Country fixed effects control for unobserved time-invariant
country features. The results which we obtain are pretty similar to GMM estima-
tion results, though the coefficient of 1.25% obtained is lower than the coefficient
resulting from GMM estimation. However, the theoretical underpinning is the same.
Most of the coefficients on other control variables exhibit the expected signs and are
significant. Carrying out fixed effects estimation in this case is likely to result in ob-
taining biased estimates. All in all, our overall regression results are interpreted with
respect to the results obtained from GMM estimations because we consider GMM
to be a better estimator.1 Once again the results obtained from the fixed effects
methodology confirm the hypothesis that remittances promote financial inclusion.
<< insert table 2 here >>
Categorization of countries into regional groups paves way for evaluating the extent
to which remittance inflows into various countries in divergent regions around the
world promote financial inclusion. We therefore split the sample by geographic
1GMM estimations takes into account lagged endogenous variables which are not captured when
fixed effects estimations are carried out.
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region. We consider this to be an important aspect to facilitate comparison between
regional groups. This is a salient feature especially when we take policy implications
into consideration because countries in these regions can benchmark against each
other and make necessary reforms subject to necessity. The results suggest a positive
remittances-financial inclusion nexus with exception of two regions: East Asia and
Pacific and Southern Asia. However, fixed effects estimation results for South Asia
is consistent with the overall expected results. On the contrary, results observed for
East Asia and Pacific consistently display a negative coefficient. The most obvious
explanation for this is the fact that only three countries feature as representantive
countries among our sample that fall within East Asia and Pacific region. In this
case therefore, sample size is a limiting factor and most probably contributes to
mixed results.
<< insert table 3 here >>
The computation of the index of financial inclusion incorporated three dimensions
which consequently resulted from taking into account various individual respective
indicators. As part of our robustness checks, we take into account certain specific
indicators which are considered to be at the center stage of financial inclusion. This
supports the hypothesis that each of the indicators was useful and rightly included as
an indicator of financial inclusion. Usage and banking penetration yield results which
bear the expected sign. However, in the case of access, the coefficient is negative but
all the same it is not significant. Prior studies have also taken into account bank
account as a proxy for financial inclusion although it is well acknowledged that
number of bank accounts as a measure on their own do not sufficiently measure the
extent of financial inclusion. We also run regressions taking into consideration bank
accounts as our dependent variable. We obtain consistent results in the sense that
the coefficient on remittances as a share of GDP is positive and significant. These
results confirm that the constituent components of the index of financial inclusion
earlier constructed are not only relevant but also valid. Consequently, the individual
respective dimension indices and corresponding composite index is well constructed
and deemed to be reliable.
<< insert table 4 here >>
7 Conclusions
To emphasize the importance of remittances for developing countries, a lot of liter-
ature examines the impact of remittances on various aspects of countries’ develop-
21
ment. However, little attention has been dedicated to examine the nexus between
remittances and financial inclusion. This paper sheds more light on the relationship
between remittance inflows and financial inclusion. We employ GMM IV estima-
tion as our main model and compare our results with the outcome of fixed effects
estimation to support our results.
We consider financial inclusion and remittances to be important variables worth
examining because both are attributed to inclusive economic growth and poverty
reduction. From a theoretical perspective, we could link up these two notions by
stating that by the very aspect of sending remittances, migrants play the role of
financial intermediaries. This is because they facilitate the process through which
households and small scale entrepreneurs go to overcome credit constraints and
imperfections in financial markets. This therefore suggests that remittances do in
fact pave the way for financial inclusion through financial development channel.
The results depicted from this study give evidence to support the hypothesis that
remittances contribute to financial inclusion. Our results suggest that increasing re-
mittance flows positively and significantly improves financial inclusion. On average,
a country that receives remittances increase to the tune of 1% of GDP is likely to
experience approximately 2.49% increment in the degree of financial inclusion. Our
results still hold after controlling for unobserved country characteristics and GMM
IV regressions to correct for potential endogeneity of remittances. It can also be
observed that the average marginal effect of remittances on financial inclusion is
more pronounced at higher levels of remittances as a proportion of GDP.
Our research is beset by data limitations. Much as it would be important to incor-
porate data on internet banking and mobile banking, we are constrained by data
availability since these variables are not available within the time spectrum of our
study. Measurement error is also known to be inherent in remittances data. Since
quality data is key for provision of appropriate policy guidance, it is imperative for
responsible institutions to work on means of improving data collection, recording
and reporting. This is likely to improve the quality of research and the resultant
policy recommendations for respective policy makers.
Considering the implication of this research from a policy perspective, it would be
important for policy makers to formulate and implement policies that encourage
migrant workers to remit. Efforts should be undertaken to improve financial system
efficiency because remittance flows through formal channels are more likely to have
a positive effect on financial inclusion as opposed to remittances through informal
channels. Aiming at reducing remittance costs is also very important. Reducing
transaction fees will motivate poor migrants to remit since their disposable income
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will not significantly drop as a consequence of remitting funds. This is because remit-
tances and the associated costs of remitting funds will only account for a relatively
small portion of migrants’ disposable income.
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8 Data Sources and Definitions
• RemGDP is the ratio of remittance inflows to GDP. Personal remittances
comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal trans-
fers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by
resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers
thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individu-
als. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and
other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not
resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum
of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments
Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. This data is from
World Bank World Development Indicators.
• DomCredit is domestic credit to private sector which refers to financial re-
sources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through
loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these
claims include credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial cor-
porations where data are available (including corporations that do not accept
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits).
This data is from World Bank World Development Indicators.
• Logpop is the natural logarithm of population. Total population is based on
the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of
legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates. This data
is derived from World Bank World Development Indicators.
• Logxr is the natural logarithm of exchange rate. Official exchange rate refers to
the exchange rate determined by national authorities or to the rate determined
in the legally sanctioned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average
based on monthly averages (local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar).
This data is derived from World Bank database captured as part of the World
Development Indicators.
• Logmbs is the natural logarithm of mobile subscriptions. Mobile cellular tele-
phone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that
provide access to cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into)
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the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid ac-
counts (i.e. that have been used during the last three months). The indicator
applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It
excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public
mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and
telemetry services. This data is derived from World Bank database captured
as part of the World Development Indicators.
• Ctrlcorr denotes control of corruption. This reflects perceptions of the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and
private interests. This data is derived from World Governance Indicators. The
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing
the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise,
citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.
These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector
firms.
• AgeDR is age dependency ratio. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of depen-
dents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to the working-age population
i.e. those ages 15-64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100
working-age population. This data is derived from World Bank database cap-
tured as part of World Development Indicators.
• lnGDPpc is the logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP per capita is gross domestic
product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. This data
is derived from World Bank database captured as part of World Development
Indicators.
• Logint refers to the logarithm of internet users. Internet users in this case
are defined as individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in
the last 12 months. Various channels through which internet can be accessed
include but are not limited to via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital
assistant, games machine, digital TV etc. This data is derived from the World
Bank database captured as part of the World Development Indicators.
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• Litrate denotes literacy rate. Percentage of the population age 15 and above
who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their
everyday life. Generally, literacy also encompasses numeracy, the ability to
make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing
the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group
population and multiplying the result by 100. This data is derived from the
World Bank database captured as part of the World Development Indicators.
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A Country Coverage
Argentina Dominican Republic Lebanon Rwanda
Azerbaijan DR Congo Lesotho Sao Tome and Principe
Bangladesh Ecuador Libya Seychelles
Belize Egypt Madagascar Sierra Leone
Botswana Equitorial Guinea Malawi Singapore
Brazil Estonia Maldives Solomon Islands
Cabo Verde Ethiopia Mauritania Swaziland (Renamed to eSwatini)
Cameroon Gabon Moldova Syrian Arab Republic
Chad Georgia Myanmar Tajikistan
China Hungary Namibia Thailand
Colombia Israel Nigeria Uganda
Comoros Kenya Pakistan Uruguay
Congo Kuwait Paraguay Yemen
Costa Rica Kyrgyzstan Peru
Croatia Lao People’s DR Qatar
Djibouti Latvia Rwanda
29
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Max Min
TIFI 671 -2.1958 1.4993 0.5726 -8.8455
RemGDP 671 4.8488 8.1470 49.290 0.0000
Ctrlcorr 671 -0.3883 0.7757 2.4167 -1.8365
AgeDr 671 65.049 19.079 108.57 17.031
Litrate 671 19.501 36.527 99.896 0.0000
DomCredit 671 32.267 28.325 147.00 0.0000
Logmbs 665 3.7752 1.1626 5.3865 -1.6854
lnGDPpc 661 7.9470 1.3669 11.461 4.9125
Logpop 671 15.716 1.9398 21.034 11.321
Logint 665 2.3096 1.5130 4.5162 -3.7157
GDPg 661 331.00 190.96 661.00 1.0000
Notes : We derive the variables displayed from various sources as documented under
section 8
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B Figures and Tables
Figure 2: Comparison between Sarma’s index and the newly constructed index
45° line
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Sa
rm
as
 IF
I
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
New IFI
Notes: We utilized 2010 indices data for both the newly constructed index and Sarma’s index for
comparison purposes because that was the most recent year when Sarma’s index was available.
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Figure 3: Year to year comparison between Sarma’s index and the newly constructed
index
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C IFI and Transformed TIFI
Country IFI TIFI Country IFI TIFI
Argentina 0.3352 -0.2974 Latvia 0.4412 -0.1026
Azerbaijan 0.2298 -0.5253 Lebanon 0.2657 -0.4415
Bangladesh 0.1547 -0.7377 Lesotho 0.0986 -0.9608
Belize 0.2532 -0.4698 Libya 0.2723 -0.4270
Botswana 0.2096 -0.5764 Madagascar 0.0193 -1.7063
Brazil 0.3625 -0.2451 Malawi 0.0672 -1.1426
Cabo Verde 0.4931 -0.0120 Maldives 0.4059 -0.1654
Cameroon 0.0209 -1.6707 Mauritania 0.0436 -1.3407
Chad 0.0074 -2.1247 Moldova 0.3400 -0.2881
China 0.1386 -0.7936 Myanmar 0.0415 -1.3641
Colombia 0.5263 0.0458 Namibia 0.2958 -0.3767
Comoros 0.0297 -1.5139 Nigeria 0.1756 -0.6718
Congo 0.0110 -1.9548 Pakistan 0.0850 -1.0319
Costa Rica 0.3727 -0.2260 Paraguay 0.1230 -0.8532
Croatia 0.5653 0.1141 Peru 0.2503 -0.4764
Djibouti 0.0480 -1.2972 Qatar 0.2805 -0.4092
Dominican Republic 0.2309 -0.5226 Rwanda 0.0501 -1.2780
DR Congo 0.0379 -1.4049 Samoa 0.2915 -0.3856
Ecuador 0.2403 -0.4998 Sao Tome and Principe 0.2090 -0.5781
Egypt 0.1148 -0.8873 Seychelles 0.5165 0.0286
Equitorial Guinea 0.0917 -0.9958 Sierra Leone 0.0595 -1.1991
Estonia 0.6602 0.2885 Singapore 0.6919 0.3513
Ethiopia 0.0528 -1.2538 Solomon Islands 0.1213 -0.8599
Gabon 0.1266 -0.8389 Swaziland 0.1623 -0.7128
Georgia 0.4413 -0.1025 Syrian Arab Republic 0.0625 -1.1760
Hungary 0.3853 -0.2029 Tajikistan 0.2327 -0.5181
Israel 0.5218 0.0380 Thailand 0.4583 -0.0727
Kenya 0.2896 -0.3896 Uganda 0.0521 1.2600
Kuwait 0.2143 -0.5642 Uruguay 0.3481 -0.2726
Kyrgyzstan 0.1217 -0.8585 Yemen 0.0347 -1.4439
Lao People’s DR 0.1336 -08121
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Table 2: Baseline Results
GMM & Fixed Effects Results
Variable GMM Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: TIFI
RemGDP 2.49 1.25
(*10−2) [1.94]* [1.97]**
DomCredit 0.71 0.33
[1.85]* [7.70]***
Ctrlcorr 0.54 0.40
[1.69]* [2.66]**
AgeDR 1.64 1.49
(*10−2) [0.97] [2.11]**
lnGDPpc 0.32 0.38
[1.32] [5.61]***
Litrate 0.05 -0.35
(*10−3) [0.02] [-0.85]
Logpop -3.69 10.24
(*10−2) [-0.34] [0.75]
Logmbs 0.33 0.05
[2.36]** [1.25]
GDPg 0.60 5.17
(*10−3) [2.18]** [1.65]*
No. of countries 61 61
No. of observations 583 583
Hansen Test 0.179
Notes: Absolute values of z and t statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3: GMM Regional Groups Results
GMM Estimation Results
Variable MENA EAP SSA SA ECA LAC
Dependent variable: TIFI
RemGDP 0.88 -3.37 0.79 -2.12 0.05 1.45
(*10−2) [1.69]* [-3.43]* [1.55] [-0.54] [0.05] [2.18]**
DomCredit 0.20 0.16 -0.02 0.27 0.26 0.23
[1.80]* [1.83]* [-0.32] [1.76]* [1.99]** [1.72]*
Ctrlcorr -0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.14
[-0.62] [-0.07] [0.33] [0.52] [0.93] [0.81]
AgeDR 0.35 0.92 -0.34 0.87 0.01 1.02
(*10−2) [1.08] [1.84]* [-0.62] [1.59] [1.86]* [1.89]*
lnGDPpc 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.07
[1.93]* [1.70]* [-0.30] [1.34] [1.53] [1.09]
Litrate 0.57 0.58 0.70 0.07 0.74 1.22
(*10−3) [0.62] [0.63] [1.35] [0.07] [0.68] [1.15]
Logpop -0.75 -0.03 1.51 0.60 1.33 3.77
(*10−2) [-0.15] [-0.07] [0.56] [0.16] [0.37] [0.99]
Logmbs -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
[-0.64] [-0.15] [-0.30] [0.16] [0.72] [0.20]
GDPg 5.74 7.12 4.09 5.62 7.56 7.81
(*10−4) [1.50] [2.36]** [1.44] [1.66]* [1.90]* [2.11]**
No. of countries 9 7 23 3 9 10
No. of observations 82 64 220 30 9 100
Hansen Test 0.394 0.508 0.359 0.527 0.783 0.693
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 4: GMM Respective Indicators Results
GMM Estimation Results
Variable Usage Banking Penetration Access Bank Accounts
Dependent variable: TIFI
RemGDP 4.72 6.97 -0.57 5.41
[1.82]* [1.91]* [-0.31] [1.94]*
DomCredit 132.08 33.90 41.67 -109.91
[2.68]** [0.36] [1.26] [-1.32]
Ctrlcorr 72.78 152.30 20.97 -60.73
[1.38] [1.64] [0.53] [-0.58]
AgeDR 4.10 4.34 -0.21 6.26
[1.43] [1.16] [-0.11] [1.48]
lnGDPpc 44.81 31.11 46.25 113.92
[1.33] [0.68] [1.90]* [2.01]**
Litrate 0.19 0.62 0.32 0.70
[0.62] [1.35] [1.16] [1.12]
Logpop -6.89 0.87 0.71 8.06
[0.717] [0.04] [0.05] [0.30]
Logmbs 16.14 47.81 48.18 43.68
[0.81] [1.54] [3.39]** [1.17]
GDPg 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.16
[2.39]** [2.47]** [2.63]** [1.48]
No. of countries 61 61 61 61
No. of observations 583 583 583 583
Hansen Test 0.114 0.185 0.351 0.333
Notes: Absolute values of z statistics are in brackets. The symbols *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
The dynamics surrounding remittances and their impact on recipient economies have been stud-
ied by a vast number of researchers. However, the greatest challenge has been to reach a con-
sensus pertaining characteristics of these flows. To the extent that researchers provide mixed
evidence, it becomes overly complicated to formulate optimal policies because there will be
reservations on the part of the policy makers.
The four papers encompassed in this thesis shed light on some of the most pertinent issues
surrounding remittances. They attempt to contribute to the existing literature on remittances
and their impact on developing economies as well as introduce new insights.
The result of the first paper supports the notion that remittances act as a shock absorber and
can potentially cushion economies against negative shocks. The underyling concept takes into
consideration countercyclical remittances. The insight provided in this case corroborates with
prior researchers who provided evidence to the effect that remittances help countries during
financial crises, conflicts, disasters among other forms of negative shocks.
The second paper suggests that procyclical remittances pose a challenge to monetary policy
because remittances would further boost a heated economy thus forcing the central bank to
embrace more aggressive interest rates. There is likelihood of adverse effects being observed
because high interest rates will attract capital flows resulting in exchange rate appreciation and
ultimately Dutch-disease phenomenon. The converse holds during a recession.
We disentangle and demystify cyclicality of remittances in the third paper. We demonstrate
that a greater proportion of remittances emanating from low and middle income countries are
acyclical because when a distinction is made between North-South and South-South flows, it
is evident that South-South flows exhibit reduced cyclical patterns. This, in effect introduces a
new perspective and insight owing to the fact that countercyclical remittances have proven to
have yielded positive outcomes with respect to developing countries.
The last paper in this dissertation brings to light the impact of remittances on financial inclusion.
The results show that indeed remittances promote financial inclusion to a great extent. With
respect to developing economies which are strategizing poverty reduction measures as well as
inclusive economic growth measures, efforts could be dedicated toward creating a favorable
environment to facilitate international remittance flows.
All in all, the empirical results would help to formulate appropriate policies that would harness
the maximum benefits associated with remittance inflows.
Moving forward, it is imperative to leverage on digital revolutions to create new technologies
that allow remittance transfer organizations to reduce transaction costs and open new channels.
This will greatly enhance convenience for remitters and ultimately improve transparency levels
as well as accountability for regulators and policy makers. On the other hand, policy makers
have to keep a watchful eye on the remittance trends and intervene where necessary to mitigate
potential interference with monetary policy transmission process.
There are high prospects of future innovations enabling migrants to have a better grasp and
control over alternative uses of remittances. This could be in form of human capital investments
or investments in small and medium sized enterprises. Policy makers can also channel remit-
tances toward development oriented projects. Within this whole framework, we acknowledge
that remittances are private transfers and they can only be leveraged through coming up with
incentives that preserve the rights of migrants while enhancing pro-development measures. Pri-
ority should therefore be given to projects that rank high within the needs hierachy of the local
population.
Additionally, future research should critically address the methodological issues in studying in-
ternational remittances. Aggregate remittances figures availed on various websites do not cap-
ture informal flows. This calls for concerted efforts to create a platform which involves both
migrants and recipient households data in order to come up with more reliable estimates.
Affidavit
I hereby declare that I completed the papers submitted and listed hereafter independently and
only with those forms of support mentioned in the relevant paper or in the following supple-
mentary list. When working with the authors listed, I contributed no less than a proportionate
share of the work. In the analyses that I have conducted and to which I refer in the papers, I
have followed the principles of good academic practice, as stated in the Statute of Justus Liebig
University Giessen for Ensuring Good Scientific Practice.
Immaculate Nafula Machasio
Giessen, November 30, 2018
Submitted Papers:
1. Machasio, I. (2016): ‘The Role of Remittance Inflows to Developing Countries in the After-
math of Sovereign Defaults’, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 39-2016.
2. Machasio, I., & Tillmann, P. (2016): ‘Remittance Inflows and State-Dependent Monetary
Policy Transmission in Developing Countries’, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in
Economics 38-2016.
3. Machasio, I., & Tillmann, P. (2017): ‘Are Remittances Cyclical? The Role of South-South
Flows’, Journal of International Trade, Politics and Development, 1, 33-48.
4. Machasio, I. (2018): ‘Do Remittance Flows Promote Financial Inclusion?’, MAGKS Joint
Discussion Paper Series in Economics 26-2018.
